Jeffrey Goldberg steps into the debate over the nature of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's incendiary remarks about Israel, to call out Harvard Professor Stephen Walt of 'Walt-Mearsheimer' (in)fame(y) for downplaying the idea that Ahmadinejad is "inciting to genocide" (Walt's terms) in Israel. For reasons that a Persian speaker will readily comprehend (and a sufficiently deterimined non-sokhbako could figure out), I'm going to refer to the Iranian president by his nickname among his adoring people, 'Ahmaghinejad,' from here on out.

Goldberg's check and mate many times over is a tranche of Ahmaghinejad quotes, Call Him 'Ahmaghinejad' Or 'Avaleenejad': Iran laughs at, not with himfrom the notorious "wipe off the map" comment of October 2005, to a statement just this month, all of which are variously loathsome vamps on the old "Israel must cease to exist" standard. I've noted here at Jewcy before that Ahmaghinejad's "wipe off the map" remark of October 2005 is a mistranslation; my objections to repeating it are 1) it offends me as a student of Persian and 2) given the enormous supply of sickening comments from Ahmaghinejad re: Israel, of which Goldberg usefully provides a small but still representative sample, there isn't even a pragmatic rationale for persisting in mistranslating the remark. (We have an idea of what Ahmaghinejad says about Israel publicly; imagine what he says in private.) I'd hope Goldberg would credit the idea that, however merited objections to Walt and Mearsheimer are, fealty to the correct use and translation of Persian doesn't entail being an apologist for Ahmaghinejad.

The question, of course, is how best to interpret the comments. It's not a straightforward task, since Ahmaghinejad's speeches are littered with quotes from the Ayatollah Khomeini and from medieval Persian poets that involve idioms that don't correspond to anything in English, so figuring out what he meant involves either learning the language, or doing some careful inductive guesswork and hoping for the best.

Although I haven't been able to track down the originals of all the quotes Goldberg reproduces (there might be links on the Ahmadine-blog, in case somebody is willing to pore through the archives), I've looked at a few, and they have a number of recurrent features. Ahmaghinejad rarely if ever refers to Israel by name, but rather as رزیم اشفالگار (rezhim-e eshghalgar), the 'occupying regime', of which the first word is an obvious western import that only has a narrow, technical meaning referring to a particular governmental apparatus (generally, as in English, in pejorative tones). By contrast, the Persian words for 'country' and 'nation' in a broader, non-technical sense are کشور (keshvar) and ملت (mellat), respectively. Moreover, the stem of the key verbs in Ahmaghinejad's proclamations of Israel's doom (at least, in the ones I've looked at) is always شدن (shodan) rather than کردن (kardan). This is a major, not a minor semantic difference: the latter is used in active and indicative constructions; the former is used in passive and subjunctive constructions. Which means that, on strict semantics, Ahmaghinejad has been expressing either a belief that Israel will cease to exist or a desire that it will (or both), rather than stating a policy objective.

Now, none of this suggests for a moment that the narrow semantic values of Ahmaghinejad's declarations of the impending destruction of the state of Israel completely exhaust the messages he was communicating (that's the first lesson of practical linguistics). And the upshot of the fact that Ahmaghinejad, strictly speaking, fastened his attacks on the Israeli "regime" rather than Israel or the Israelis, and that he never explicitly signed on to the project of bringing about the destruction of that "regime," isn't that Ahmaghinejad was really talking about flowers and candy and has gotten a rough break in the Western press. On the contrary, it simply goes to show that a politician is a politician no matter where he's from, and what distinguishes even deranged racist ignoramus politicians from deranged racist ignoramus non-politicians is that the former will speak calculatingly, as the politicians that they are. So even though Ahmaghinejad isn't literally pledging the Iranian state to a policy of genocide, he is personally endorsing an event --- the destruction of the Israeli government --- that would very likely entail the slaying of large numbers of Israelis.

Furthermore, Walt's term 'incitement' is (unintentionally) spot-on. When a leader "incites violence," he or she seldom does so by literally telling those under his or her influence to go out and kill, injure or maim anyone (we would call that "ordering attacks," not "incitement to violence"). Rather, incitement standardly consists in pushing just the right buttons to spur violence while maintaining a veneer of deniability. And that, plainly, is part of what Ahmaghinejad has been communicating, i.e.: "While I, the terribly important president of this holy state don't have the time or inclination to get my hands dirty, it sure is about time somebody did something to remove the regime occupying Qods from the pages of time and history."

There's just no other plausible way of interpreting the comments while being simultaneously faithful to both semantics and to the pragmatic implications that enable us as human beings, rather than artificial intelligence, to communicate with one another. Call me crazy, but I have a feeling that if, say, an Afrikaner politician mused about how black rule in South Africa is shortly coming to an end and pre-emptively endorsed a campaign of violence and intimidation against Africans without literally pledging to be a part of it, nobody would have a difficult time understanding what was up.

But the heinousness of Ahmaghinejad's incitements immediately raises the question of just what influence he has, and this is where I break with Goldberg. Permit me this Godwin's law violation, since I'm committing it only to strengthen the case I'm arguing against. Suppose that Hitler had had all the beliefs about Jews that he did in fact have, desired to exterminate the Jewish people, etc., but lived out his days as a penurious mediocre landscape painter in Munich never committing so grave a crime as jaywalking. His beliefs themselves wouldn't be any less vile under those circumstances, but in such a scenario, the fact that he held those beliefs just wouldn't be very important. Indeed, it's a matter of simple statistical probability that there have been untold numbers of people whose personal antisemitism and genocidal fantasies were more virulent than Hitler's on some sort of one-to-one comparison of beliefs, but we just don't and shouldn't care about such people. What made Hitler a menace was not only the evil of his ideology, which on its own couldn't do anything, but also his control of the most powerful war machine in world history up to that point.

That's why fretting over Ahmaghinejad's remarks about Israel is a waste of energy, even as it's good to stay alert to the casual antisemitism that excuses such remarks but would never countenance equivalent incitements against other groups . Maybe --- maybe! --- there are some irredentists in Gaza or the West Bank whose Shi'ism is strong enough to overcome the hatred of Persians they've been taught since childhood, who don't recognize what a laughingstock Ahmaghinejad is in Iran, and who take the clear message of his remarks to heart. But how many such people could there be, who will engage in terrorism against Israel because of Ahmaghinejad, but wouldn't have otherwise? I strongly doubt it would take very many hands to count them all.

As for the significance of Ahmaghinejad's remarks for the Iranian government and Iranian society, it's basically non-existent. Despite the fact that his title is "President" --- as I'll continue to point out again and again --- Iranian state power is completely in the hands of the small circle of clerics around Ali Khamenei. Any power Ahmaghinejad exercises is at Khamenei & co.'s discretion, and can be rescinded on a whim. Indeed, as observers of the Iranian political scene well know, Khamenei's loathing of Ahmaghinejad is nearly as strong as that of educated Iranian society at large. Khamenei has barely tolerated Ahmaghinejad's presence in the government because he represented a significant, boorish segment of the Iranian "electorate" --- a term I bracket with scare quotes both because the pool of Iranian voters is not representative of the country, and the elections in which they vote do not have any practical effect on the composition of the real leadership. And now that Ahmaghinejad's buffoonery has destroyed whatever popular support he enjoyed, Khamenei and the clerics were swift to exclude him from the government in every respect except nominally.

To be sure, many of the interests the regime in Tehran is working to advance conflict with American interests, and the regime's suppression of liberal freedoms and abuse of women and homosexuals is abhorrent. Nonetheless, Khamenei et al., who do hold power, have demonstrated again and again that they are practitioners of realpolitik, unlike Ahmaghinejad, who is an apocalyptic fanatic but fortunately doesn't hold power.

And in fact, the United States and Israel have some significant interests in common with Iran. (Those Zionists who long for the days of the Shah can fill in the details of why Iran is Israel's only natural ally in the middle East.) American and Israeli strategic interests and security are threatened by militarized Sunni extremists; and so are Iranian strategic interests and security. Some of the worst disasters in western and central Asia that could befall the United States and Israel are the takeover of Iraq by Wahhabist fanatics, the recapture of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the Talibanization of Pakistan, or any combination thereof; those would arguably be even greater disasters for Iran. And the Iranian regime wants to preserve its power, which in practice will mean delivering economic prosperity; likewise, the US wants Iran to scuttle its nuclear research and militarization, and holds important keys to helping Iran achieve prosperity. And just to conclude scratching the surface, the Iranian people themselves, whatever the positions of their government, are decidedly pro-Western and pro-American.

These features of Iran's polity and society and of the international relations picture by no means guarantee that diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic will be successful; but they do nonetheless come with some welcome sureties. As long as Iran is controlled by Ali Khamenei, the chances of a first strike on a nuclear power with massive deterrent capabilities (e.g. the US or Israel) are effectively null. Such a strike would be suicide, and the actual Iranian regime, as opposed to its court jester, is not suicidal. Moreover, the foundation already exists, and indeed has existed for decades, for engagement with Iran not merely at the highest strata of the government, but with the Iranian people themselves. Say what you will about Zbigniew Brzezinski --- but don't dare say it about the recently departed, much beloved William Odom --- they had exactly the right approach for dealing with Iran, and helpfully put Ahmaghinejad in his rightful, unserious place in the process.

As Brzezinski elaborated in a recent appearance on Morning Joe (sorry, no transcript available), applying the model of long-term cultural penetration through semi-official outreach like Radio Free Europe, encouragement of consumerism, exposure to the fruits of western liberties, etc., that was so successful in weakening the Iron Curtain, has even stronger prospects for success in Iran, where popular affinity for Western and indeed American values is pervasive. Iran certainly presents a major foreign policy challenge, and even if it poses no existential threats, its sponsorship of anti-Israeli terrorism is intolerable.

But stamping our feet won't do anything about that, and coming to a correct moral judgment about Iranian support for Hezbollah and Mahmoud Ahmaghinejad's eliminationist fantasies is not even the beginning, let alone the end, of policy to curb the Iranian threat. In particular, devoting vastly more attention than he deserves to an antisemitic circus act who can only be relevant to the future of US- and Israeli-Iranian relations if Americans and Israelis elect to make him relevant, threatens to obscure the full picture, in which engagement with Iran, in addition to being a challenge, is also an enormous opportunity.

Ahmadinjead Greets Anti-Zionist Jews: There's no reason to resort to lying to establish his lunacy Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said all sorts of shocking, crazy, horrible things. So many that it shouldn't be hard for someone looking to score points off of the shocking, crazy, horrible things Ahmadinejad has said to base his case on things that have actually come out of Ahmadinejad's mouth. (For example: He described the Israeli state as "a stinking corpse" and described the Holocaust as a "myth." Those are appalling remarks; feel free to quote them.)

However, contra John McCain, Ahmadinejad didn't call for Israel to be "wiped off the map" (as virtually every expert translator from Juan Cole to MEMRI agrees). What Ahmadinejad did say in a thoroughly gruesome October 2005 speech that provided more than enough material to answer any lingering doubts about Ahmadinejad's awfulness, was this:

Imam (i.e., Khomeini) ghoft ('said') een rezhim-e ('this regime') eshghalgar-e ('occupying') Qods ('Jerusalem') bayad ('should' or 'must') az safheh-ye ('from the page of') ruzgar ('time' or 'daily life') mahv shavad ('fade' or 'disappear' or 'be obliterated,' depending on context).

The Persian words for 'country' are keshvar and mamlekat, and the Persian for 'nation' is mellat, which, like English 'nation', can be a synonym for 'a people' (as in the party of the great Iranian democrat Darioush Forouhar, Hebz-e Mellat-e Iran, which could be rendered equally acceptably as "Party of the Nation of Iran" or "Party of the People of Iran"). Yet the object of Ahmadinejad's sentence is rezhim, which is (obviously) a direct importation of 'regime' that only and always refers to a particular government and, as in English, has technical and pejorative connotations. Moreover, Persian has no "wipe off the map" idiom, and even if it did, applying that idiom to 'regime' rather than 'country' or 'nation' is just a category error.

The controversial verb of the sentence, mahv shodan, can range in meaning from 'to fade' or 'to vanish' to 'to be obliterated' or 'to be annihilated.' So which is it? Ahmadinejad uses mahv shodan in reference to the fall of the Soviet Union, of the Shah, and of Saddam Hussein in the same speech. In other words, Ahmadinejad called for the destruction of the Israeli government and possibly for war --- which is objectionable enough! --- not genocide. (He's also deliberately adopting "regime change" language; I can't say I'm surprised the mistranslators failed to see that.)

So why the unrelenting lying about what Ahmadinejad said, given the surfeit of reality-based material available for condemning him? My hunch is that it has something to do with the unrelenting lying about Ahmadinejad's role in the Iranian government.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: Iranians call him "Ahmaghinejad" (meaning "son of an ass") One more thing about Jeffrey Goldberg's interview with John McCain: It was an object lesson in how completely John McCain's position on Iran depends on blatantly lying. First and foremost, there is McCain's fixation on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad holds no power and has no influence in formulating policy except at the discretion of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; and since Khamenei and the clerical leadership detests Ahmadinejad, he in fact holds no power and has no influence in shaping Iranian policy in any respect relevant to American policy. McCain had no excuse for not knowing that before Joe Klein confronted him with the facts two weeks ago, and he certainly has no excuse for repeating the lie after he has been publicly corrected. Yet there he went, presenting a case against diplomatic engagement with Iran that rests on the personal odiousness of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

What McCain has, in lieu of an excuse for continuing to lie about Ahmadinejad's importance, is a tactical rationale for doing so, namely that Ahmadinejad is a loon who says frightening things. (Indeed, he has said so many loony, frightening things that one would think McCain wouldn't have to resort to lying about what Ahmadinejad has said.) The evident goal is to scare people into voting for him by conning them into believing that Iran, like Nazi Germany and unlike any other foreign adversary of the United States in its 230 year history, is governed by an ideology immune to rational deterrence.

Note that even if that were true, what made Nazi Germany a threat that had to be defeated by war was the combination of its ideology and its possession of the most powerful war machine in human history up to that point. Hence McCain also lies endlessly about Iran's capacities, breezily mentioning to Goldberg that Iran, a nation without any nuclear weapons, existentially threatens Israel, a nation with a large nuclear arsenal. He lies about the scale of the Iranian threat relative to the Soviet Union, augments that lie by lying about his opponent's uncontroversially true observation that there is no reason for a national panic attack over Iran, and bolsters his case for a national panic attack by reference to his distinct lies about Ahmadinejad and his (non-)role in formulating Iranian policy. What's so pitiful about this mendacity is that Iran really does pose a major national security and foreign policy challenge --- not every threat has to be existential to count as a threat! --- which McCain's fabulism obscures.

Just as it obscures the tremendous opportunity the next president may have in light of Khamenei and the clerics' decision to geld Ahmadinejad and elevate his rival, Ali Larijani, as well as the general affection of the Iranian people for the United States (but wariness about blowhards threatening war). If he doesn't understand Iranian politics and can't be bothered to educate himself, the least McCain could do, for the sake of his own credibility, is quit trying to frame the election as a contest between experience and naivete.

Ali Larijani (Right) With Javier Solana: It's almost as if diplomacy with Iran is worth a shot One can be forgiven for not noticing, in light of the earth-shattering revelations in Scott McClellan's book, that the Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, elected a new speaker this week, Ali Larijani, by a resounding 232 to 31 margin. Before joining the Majlis in March, Larijani had been one of two personal appointees of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to the Supreme National Security Council, in which capacity he was Iran's chief international representative on nuclear technology policy. Before that, he was a candidate in the presidential election of 2005, and has been one of the chief rivals to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the favor of Khamenei, for control of the conservative political coalition, and for power in Iran.

Now, there's no reason to lionize Larijani pre-emptively. His history suggests that he is far less reformist than say, Muhammad Khatami, whose presidency was a pretty big disappointment. But he is the leader of the pragmatist wing of the conservative coalition and not a raving loon like Ahmadinejad, so his elevation to the speakership of the Majlis is a fairly profound signal that Khamenei is displeased with Iran's strategic drift. Which means conditions exist for a reorientation of Iranian policy (especially if Larijani defeats Ahmadinejad in the upcoming elections in 2009).

What does all this mean for Americans? Firstly, that the next president will likely have an opportunity for diplomacy with Iran that hasn't existed since 2003, and if he (or she) squanders that opportunity without so much as trying to put a halt to Iranian nuclearization through negotiations, we'll all be that much less safe as a result. So it's probably worthwhile thinking about which presidential candidates have made a steadfast promise to make you less safe when and if you vote this November.

Secondly and relatedly, it's probably time for those people supporting the propagandistic charade that "talking to Iran" = "talking to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Holocaust denier" to feel a little agenbite of shame. Ahmadinejad's job was a combination of secretarial and ambassadorial duties, in which he could only exercise power at the discretion of Khamenei. Since Khamenei regards Ahmadinejad as a low-class dolt, Ahmadinejad has not exercised power on any matter of significance, let alone conducting Iranian foreign policy.

Thirdly and most importantly, willful mistranslations of a powerless figurehead aside, Khamenei and the Majlis' gelding of Ahmadinejad and elevation of Larijani is yet more evidence that the Iranian government acts rationally to satisfy its preferences, the most important of which is self-preservation. Which is a good thing to keep in mind when liars and hallucinators claim that Iran is a greater threat to US security than the Soviet Union was, because of some unique death-seeking quality of Iran's governing ideology. Also worth keeping in mind is that the fantasist school of Iran policy used to be the gang that denounced Reagan as a Chamberlainian surrender-monkey for talking to Mikhail "Hitler" Gorbachev.

Great news from the blogosphere. After a regrettable period of inactivity, I’m delighted to say that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has resumed blogging.  

Since my last post on the blog, a few months have passed. But this doesn't ‎mean that I have not been keeping my promise of spending fifteen minutes per week ‎on it. As a matter of fact, I have spent more than the allocated time on the blog. The ‎magnitude of the reception and acclamation from the viewers was beyond ‎expectations.

Frankly I was worried that the President’s blog might have been wiped off the map, but it appears that the sheer volume of correspondence had simply overwhelmed him. (I’m not providing a link, tempting though it would be to flood his referral logs with Jewcy readers and watch his head explode, due to unsubstantiated reports last year that visitors with Israeli IP addresses were being targeted with viruses. Feel free to Google it.)

 

With commendable politeness, he even responds to hypercritical commenters such as John Walker from Germany, whose praise is distinctly conditional (“nice blog, but you should be posting more often”): 

 

I am apologetic to those who have been waiting for my new posts, but ‎fortunately overall, the analysis of the messages has got to a point that I can start ‎writing here again.

 

While it must be admitted that the President’s style can at times be a trifle dry, one has to commend his comments policy, which frankly is a lot more liberal than that of many political bloggers closer to home. True, there is some embarrassingly laudatory sunshine being blown up his arse here and there, like this from Adara, in Canada:

I in fact think you are a great leader and I am actually contemplating moving to Iran because of the ignorance of people and the harsh things they say about all middle eastern countries

And some commenters, like Nadim from Lebanon, are perhaps just a little confused:

Mr. President; Congratulations on your recent victory. I dont know much about you, and what I do know about you comes from many conflicting sources, but I wish you good health.

…but to his eternal credit, Ahmadinejad does not censor his critics – though American reader John Jacobs’ critique might have benefited from a vigilant editor’s pencil:

I hate you. you are retarted. that simple mentally retarted

Overall, though, the President’s blog is a resounding success; ranked at 2,713 on Technorati, which is not bad given that he’s only posted twice in 6 months. (Jewcy, by way of comparison, comes in at 5,149.) Would that we could all live in a country which encourages healthy pluralism, respect for others and meaningful dialogue with their critics, rather than labouring under the fascist-imperialist jackboot of BushCheneyHalliburton & Co.

This Matt Yglesias post about the BBC's rather helpful pronunciation strike force gives me the opportunity for a linguistic kvetch that's been on my mind ever since the accession of Iran's lovable president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Namely, the conventional pronunciation of his name, repeated ad nauseum in speciously authoritative tones many, many times a day across all the major news networks, is wrong. Not just a little bit, but badly wrong.

Whenever you hear Brian Williams, or Brit Hume, or Chris Matthews, let alone any of the supposed middle-East specialists they bring on the air (everything-expert Richard Clarke was particularly egregious on an episode of Real Time with Bill Maher not long ago), pronounce "ak-ma-DEEN-uh-jad," bear this in mind: The name is a compound. 'Ahmadi' is a very common Persian surname, like Smith. 'Nejad' means family or clan. So 'Ahmadinejad' means approximately 'of the Ahmadis.' So the convention in American punditry puts the stress on the one place it can't be, which is on the bridge between the two words.

It should be pronounced 'ah-madi-ne-JAD,' accent at the end. Which brings me to another point. The 'h' in 'Mahmoud' and "Ahmad' isn't the Hebrew/Yiddish 'ch', and certainly not the 'k' sound that gentiles who can't manage a proper 'ch' seem to favor. Rather, it's a soft, barely voiced 'h' at the back of the throat. (N.B.: the same letter in Arabic is a bit harder, which I think leads to some confusion with Persian names, but 'Ahmed' should still never be pronounced 'Akmed.')

Just to show that my point here isn't about respecting Mr. Ahmadinejad per se, I'll also note that one of his most popular nicknames among Iranians is "Ahmaghinejad." The word 'ahmagh' means donkey or ass, so 'Ahmaghinejad' means son of an ass. And I heard from an Iranian friend last night that a new sobriquet is 'Avaleenejad,' which is a contrived way of calling him a primate ('aval' means first). Persians have a knack for derogatory political nicknames --- there are some fairly uproarious limericks about Jimmy Carter that are still floating around Tehran.

Now, whenever I hear, as I'm sure you have many times, one participant in a debate claim that his opponent is "engaging in semantics," or something to that effect, I get an urge to yell, "But semantic theory is very important, and has implications that goes well beyond mere language, and is frequently and inextricably tied to cultural and political theory." The foregoing is an example of what I mean: While I don't have survey data at my fingertips, I think it's a safe bet that the vast majority of media coverage of Iran and its president, in addition to incorporating mispronunciations of the latter's name, will trumpet Ahmadinejad's belligerent ideology and bizarre views about his country without mentioning that he is a preening figurehead whom most Iranians detest. So the opacity of the Persian language to the west is mirrored by an opacity of the dynamics of Persian politics --- which is at once considerably more complicated and less sensational than all but a tiny sliver of Iran coverage would suggest.

This strikes me as not an isolated, but a systemic phenomenon, arising out of the embarassing dearth of expertise in south Asia and the middle East present in both our political and our pundit classes. We should not forget that Condoleeza Rice's specialty is Kremlinology, a field that went extinct nearly twenty years ago, nor that on Sept. 10, 2001, the Bush administration saw China as the biggest strategic threat to the United States, because (among other reasons) nobody within its highest foreign policy circles particularly cared about regions of the world that were peripheral to Cold War concerns. (Yes, I'm aware that Dick Cheney was Defense Secretary during the first Gulf War; no, that doesn't make him an Arabist.)

One immediate, and potentially cataclysmic consequence of this pre-1989 crouch, is the utter bafflement within the government and along the Brookings-AEI axis (both links via Andrew Sullivan) about how to deal with the downward spiraling situation in Pakistan. During the Cold War years, both Democratic and Republican administrations adopted an unofficial pro-Pakistani tilt, stemming from Nehru's leadership in the Non-Aligned movement and vague fears about Indian socialism, and Pakistan's consequent exploitation of India's positions to get a slice of American largesse. This is why the US looked the other way at Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. (The apotheosis of the US-Pakistan relationship, and one of the worst blemishes in US diplomatic history --- nicely documented in Christopher Hitchens' book about Henry Kissinger --- was the Nixon administration's tacit approval of Pakistan's genocidal operations during the Bangladesh Liberation War.)

Whatever one thinks of the utility of an alliance with Pakistan on a Cold War rationale --- I happen to regard it as one of the stupidest afterbirths of containment policy, only slightly more strategically warranted than, say, an invasion of West Germany upon the election of Willy Brandt --- the point is that neither of the Bush Administrations nor the Clinton Administration gave any thought to re-evaluating the US-Pakistan relationship, and now we are faced with the prospect of apparently having to support a power hungry military dictator who is jailing his political opponents en masse and is intent to undermine whatever progress the US has faciliated towards regional democratization.

To tie the two threads of this post together, let me close by asking: Am I the only one who detects an absurd and dangerous incongruity in the fact that the executive and legislative branches, not to mention the chattering classes, are occupying themselves debating the justification and pragmatics of attacking a country that currently lacks any ability to project influence beyond its nearest neighbors, on the grounds that it might, someday, maybe, develop nuclear weapons, while a second country that already has an extensive nuclear arsenal and whose government, military, and intelligence services are deeply infiltrated by elements sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, teeters between anarchy and iron-fisted authoritarianism? Compare the consensus among the major presidential contenders to "keep all options on the table" (hint, hint) with regard to Iran, with the derision Barack Obama faced when he contemplated unilateral operations in Pakistan.

 

“Russia is the only country that is helping Iran to realize its nuclear program in a peaceful way.” So spoke our bearded friend in the perpetual gray suit today after an historic visit by Vladimir Putin to Tehran--the first by a Russian head of state since Stalin in 1943.

Putin been building, albeit at a willfully sluggish pace, the Bushehr nuclear power plant for the mullahs, and he's clearly impelled to lock arms with Ahmadinejad in order to buck U.S. military expansion in the Caspian (we have a base in Kyrgyzstan and have financed the upgrade of a Soviet airfield in Azerbaijan). Time's Tony Karon explains the significance of the visit:

Russia agrees that Iran has, in some of its activities, failed to meet the transparency requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the basis for the Security Council demand that it suspend enrichment until it can clear up questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restore confidence in its intentions. But the IAEA and Tehran have agreed to a "work plan" and timetable for Iran to resolve the outstanding questions, which is why further U.N. action has been tabled pending the outcome of that process.

And should that process falter or fail, another process will of course be initiated buying Tehran yet more time to do what everyone, including Vladimir Putin, knows it's trying to do with enriched uranium.

I doubt very much that Ahmadinejad is as pleased with his Kremlin counterpart as he makes out to the media. For one thing, this landmark visit could have happened years ago. (How many trips have Hugo Chavez and some grizzled apparatchik from Cuba made to Tehran since the war in Iraq began?) For another, Iran has learned the hard way that being used as a buffer in a game of Great Power intimidation rarely benefits Iran because everything is contingent on external factors such as who our next president will be, whether or not the Caspian states will get their oil pipelines built, breaking Moscow's energy monopoly, etc. Putin knows that he wields more power as a threat to the United States before the mullahs have got the bomb than he will after they've got it.

It seems to me that a major strategic blunder is being made by Washington and Paris (notwithstanding the fact that Bernard Kouchner is easily the best foreign minister France has had since Charles Gravier). Iran's biggest historic rival in the region is now its handmaid for Shiite dominance. Another frequent guest of Ahmadinejad is our own permanent ally Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president, who spent some time in Iran when his party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, was at war with Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party. There is no chance now that Iraq will ever have nuclear weapons, leaving Iranian deterrence all about one fear: regime change at home.

The U.S., by reactivating diplomacy with the Islamic Republic, could easily assure that regime change is not, nor will it be, in the offing. A deal similar to the one just struck with North Korea could be struck with the mullahs without necessarily sacrificing our commitment to funding opposition groups and NGOs inside Iran. (How's this for neocon realism: plausible deniability. It worked for the Congress for Cultural Freedom for a spell, didn't it?)

At the very least, a willingness on our part to negotiate will deprive Iran of its facile sensationalism and its attempt to depict itself as an "anti-imperialist" stalwart in the Middle East. We might make it a condition of such negotiations that Ahmadinejad call it quits on the grandstanding, his threats to Israel, and his creepy talk about the Holocaust, which does more damage in the Arab polities than it does in the Persian one. (If nothing else, it'll make my blog reading easier to see the New Left types sputter and grumble about "hegemony" and counterrevolution.)

But what do you suppose means more to Ayatollah Khamenei right now: Photo ops with Chavez, or getting Condoleeza Rice's undivided attention? Wouldn't it be worth the price of admission just to see the first American head of state touch down in Tehran since the era of the Shah, and to see it broadcast on Venezuelan, Cuban, Bolivian, Chinese, Russian televisions? What then, Al Jazeera?

 

This past Friday night Bill Maher continued his slide from politically incorrect to merely incorrect. The habitual defender of Israel had this to say about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:

"[T]he main reason we hate Ahmadinejad is because of what he said about Israel. At least that’s what sticks in my craw. And I think most people – certainly the New York papers – because he said “Israel should be wiped off the map” – some people say it’s a mistranslation. Whatever. Horrible thing to say. And he denies the Holocaust. But, those are things he says to get elected. Okay? There are Jews in the Iranian Parliament. He can’t be that anti-Semitic. I think those are the equivalent of when the Republicans in this country say, “Gay marriage will lead to death."

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Cute.

Monday's rally against Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the UN attracted the full spectrum of New York Jewry, from Conservadox to Hasidic and everything in between. I went during lunch hour and took some photos.

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The International Trade Union Confederation has published its annual survey of violations of trade union rights for 2007. (Hat tip: David at Harry's Place). Here's what it says about Iran, whose recognition of any form of labor rights is nil:

Protest activity: Despite the ban on strikes, workers' protests and other work stoppages are a daily occurrence throughout Iranian enterprises. They are often repressed. Most of these protests concern either low wages, the non-payment of wages, lay-offs or factory closures. The minimum wage set by the government is $US 140 per month, while the official poverty line stands at $US 300. Nearly two million workers have not been paid - some for nearly two years.

Barriers to organising: Obstacles to organising include the presence of security and intelligence forces in workplaces, and the increasing trend towards temporary contracts. It is common practice in Iran to fire workers the day before a three month probation period expires. They are then rehired on a new contract with a new period of three months probation. The practice is then repeated endlessly. A worker hired under such a contract is not entitled to benefits and severance pay. According to statistics reportedly provided by the government, more than 1.5 million workers are hired under such circumstances.

Suppression of Workers’ Rights Advocates: During the past year, those who tried to advocate workers rights were detained, harassed, interrogated and subjected to official and unofficial intimidation. One notable example was Dr. Nasser Zarafshan, a renowned human and workers’ rights advocate who faced several attempts on his life while in prison for defending the families of assassinated writers and intellectuals.

Other groups and individuals were also subjected to this policy of legal and illegal intimidation. Their unions were not recognised, their newspapers and websites were closed or subjected to pressure, and they were called for questioning and warned to be silent or face the wrath of the "Islamic Judiciary". Organisations like the Coordination Committee to form Independent Workers Organisations, the "Steering Committee for the Pursuit of the Right to Form Independent Workers Bodies and Organisations", the Founding Board of the Union of Dismissed and Unemployed Workers and even "Factory Committees" were refused recognition and subjected to different forms of harassment and intimidation.

Now here's Iraq, which has failed to rescind Saddam's labor laws. Perhaps the most depressing fact is that trade unionists are targeted by sectarian militias, terrorists, and joint U.S.-Iraqi forces. Should we ever find ourselves subjectively on the same side as the Mahdi Army or Al Qaeda?

Most workers banned from union membership: Given the predominance of the public sector in Iraq, many workers are deprived of the right to organise. Sectors like banking, insurance, oil and others are overwhelmingly state-owned. Even industrial factories producing batteries or cement are very often state-owned.

Only one national centre officially recognised: The only officially recognised trade union is the General Federation of Iraqi Workers (GFIW). It represents progress in the sense that it was created, in September 2005, as a result of a merger between three unions, the Iraqi Federation of Workers' Trade Unions (IFTU), previously the only one to have official recognition, the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) and the General Federation of Iraqi Trade Unions (GFITU). However, the fact that only one national trade union confederation has been granted official recognition limits freedom of association. Organisations such as the Federation of Workers' Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI) have been refused recognition.

Some employers also refused to recognise trade unions as they were not formally registered, simply due to the lack of registration offices.

Threats against workers trying to start a strike: Some employers have referred to provisions in former laws to threaten any worker attempting to take strike action in a state-owned company.

Trade unionists in danger: In the current, unstable situation in the country, trade unionists are targeted by Iraqi militias, terrorist groups, allied occupation troops and others. So many violations of trade union rights occur in Iraq that those reported at the international level can only be considered a random sample.

And here's what the international left used to say when confronted with grim realities like the above. Forgive Billy Bragg his "Manichean" tendency, won't you:

This government had an idea
And parliament made it law
It seems like it's illegal
To fight for the union any more

Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on
Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on

We went out to join the picket line
For together we cannot fail
We got stopped by police at the county line
They said, "Go home boys or you're going to jail"

Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on
Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on

It's hard to explain to a crying child
Why her Daddy can't go back
So the family suffer
But it hurts me more
To hear a scab say Sod you Jack

Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on
Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on

I'm bound to follow my conscience
And do whatever I can
But it'll take much more than the union law
To knock the fight out of a working man

Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on
Which side are you on, boys
Which side are you on

Anne Applebaum is right to say that Columbia played right into his hands by changing the subject from free speech in Iran to free speech in the U.S. I'd have asked that the Haleh Esfandiari, just released from Tehran's brutal Evin Prison, be allowed to speak right after Ahmadinejad.

Here are Lee Bollinger's opening remarks: 

It wasn't too long ago on the pages of the Shvitz we were joining in the call for the release of several Iranian-American academics who had fallen victim to the regime's crackdown against supposed velvet revolutionaries.  Now, following the long overdue release of Haleh Esfandiari comes the exciting news of the bail of Kian Tajbakhsh, just in time for Ahmadinejad's NYC vacation.  So that's one less uncomfortable question he might have to answer.  It's easy to see why, alongside, "Why do you deny the Holocaust?," "Why do you sponsor terrorism?," and "Why do you refuse to comply with international guidelines regarding the development of nuclear weapons?," he might not want to also have to answer why he locks up our fellow Americans in Evin prison.  

But really, this visit is just a vacation, an end-of-the-summer jaunt in the Big Apple.  For all the furor that's been stirred up over tonight's appearance at Columbia University, one must wonder how people on either side of the debate could be bothered to care about such a stooge as he.  Free speech advocates say we should let the university serve its purpose as the forum for controversial discussion.  That would be well and good if the visiting party were the Ayatollah Khamenei.  Then we might have substantive dialogue regarding the Iranian state, its policies and aims--but as it stands we're talking to the receptionist. 

Opponents of the visit wonder why a guy like Ahmadinejad should be given a platform at a prestigious place of higher education.  To them I can only ask--have you visited a college campus lately?  It's a marketplace of ideas, plenty of them obnoxious, idiotic, and offensive.  While it's worth asking why somebody at Columbia thought inviting such a troll might be informative, it's not for us to say whether or not it's immoral or should be forbidden.  Jean Baudrillard, the fellow who proclaimed that the Gulf War Did Not Take Place, spoke at my school while I was there and the theory hounds swarmed.  I could only wonder how it was the people in charge of organizing such events at the New School thought he might be remotely worth the time.  Same here with Columbia, but given the sensationalizing currents in higher education, it's hardly surprising.  

Opponents and detractors of the current Iranian regime should be more concerned, however, with how their protests play into the P.R. dance at hand.  Ahmadinejad is here for no reason if not to ask to lay a wreath at the WTC knowing the request will be denied and that well-meaning Americans everywhere will say, "You see, this is why the world hates us--he just wanted to lay a cute little wreath at Ground Zero and the brutes we Americans are, we won't even let him.  I wanna move to Canada."  This is analogous to bin Laden talking about global warming. 

There is talk of protesters shutting down the Upper West Side this evening.  I can't help but picture the clerics back in Tehran grinning with delight.  Iranian citizens don't like their president, but also aren't likely to appreciate anything that might be spun as anti-Iranian sentiment on the streets of New York.  These bouts seem tailored to drum up tension and anti-American sentiment both at home and abroad.  It would seem as if winning at this game would involve the refusal to give the mullahs the reaction they're counting on. 

Check out the video below and note how much context matters.  At Amir Kabir University, students shouting "Death to the Dictator" simply operates in the network of images differently.  The semiotically-minded might say that the signified ends up functioning in the world of signs in a manner independent of the signifier.  In other words, while the act of publicly denouncing a theofascist may be the same in Iran as in America, the end product of the collective utterance will not be the same because it will exist in a different network of ideas.  There, students risk their bodily safety to protest against the face of a regime that represses them every day.  Here, it could be little more than a contest of vanities--a tabloid affair for politicos.       

 

 

 

In answer to the eardrum-splitting, almost constant chorus of folks who ask, "Where are the Muslims who don't endorse violence, an authoritarian states etc., etc.," I offer up the example of one Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Kazemeyni Borujerdi and pose a question as an answer. Where are the media outlets who will make airtime for an Iranian cleric who is on death row because of his claim that:

...real Islam is free of political ornaments[...]It is included in verses whose interpretation is different from that provided by [the authorities]. Its interpretation is from 1,428 years ago. It is about the rule of the Prophet (Muhammad) and how he lived; he was against repression and opposed discrimination. Our divine leaders took food from their mouths and the mouths of their children to give it to the poor. Today, unfortunately, despite the immense wealth of this country, people live in poverty.

It is especially noteworthy that Borujerdi claims that his is a traditional interpretation of Islam.

Plenty has been said about the reformation, analogous to Christianity's Protestant one, that Islam so desperately needs in order to catch up to the modern world. But if Borujerdi's interpretation is nearly 1,500 years old and the Islamic Revolution just coming up on the big 30, one has to wonder whether it makes sense to make a fuss about 'reforming' Islam. It sounds like the reformists are the problem.

Unfortunately in reporting a story like this, one finds oneself unable to find any reasonable excuse to juxtapose Ahmadinejad's mug with a mushroom explosion...

Beneficient socialist Hugo Chavez further demonstrates his committment to people's democracy:

Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who both often rail against Washington, also signed a series of other deals to expand economic cooperation, ranging from setting up a dairy factory in Venezuela to forming an oil company.

"The two countries will united defeat the imperialism of North America," a beaming Chavez told a news conference during an official visit to the Islamic Republic, which the United States has labeled part of an "axis of evil".

I know it'll upset some readers to think of this as a Hitler-Stalin pact in miniature (after all, Chavez hasn't purged any bolivarians yet -- he's just taken to eliminating all forms of opposition), but this alliance will no doubt be welcomed effusively by those "leftists" who see hatred of the United States as ideology enough. 

Daniel at Venezuela News and Views puts it well:

What is Chavez doing in Iran again, when Iran is now openly involved with the Hamas takeover of Gaza, when the Iran backed Syrian interference in Lebanon is vox popili, when Ahmadinejerk is cracking down on any dissent as he faces for a tough nuclear situation? Chavez has nothing to do there, of course, since even the Iranian model of repression would not apply much in Venezuela. But he is so bereft of ideas that he cannot pass an opportunity to go to a country where at least one street will be lined with flag waving supportive people.

• London police defuse car packed with explosives. [Chicago Tribune]
• Legal screwups in case against President Moshe Katsav. [The Jerusalem Post]
• In 5-4 decision, Supreme Court rules against school integration. [The New York Times]
• As the Court outlaws busing, Jewish groups lament the decision; Spaniards rally against Ahmadinejad; Amos Oz wins Spanish lit prize. [Jewish Telegraph Agency]
• Mexico's got its Bloomberg: proposal to ban lighting up in Mexico City bars. [The Los Angeles Times]
• How many frequent flier miles to go to the moon? [SPACE.com]
• Iron Mike says, "Smile, it's Friday!"

Travel abroad and come back labeled a "spy." Run a newspaper and don't even think about reporting economic crisis or the possibility of your country's discussions with the United States about Iraq. There's really nothing newsworthy in pointing out that Iran is a closed society. But when its sclerotic regime tries to vacuum seal the place in the face of growing opposition -- well, then you get a New York Times article:

Not that everyone has been intimidated. More than 50 leading economists published a harshly worded, open letter to the president saying his policies were bringing economic ruin. High unemployment persists, there has been little foreign investment and inflation is galloping, with gasoline alone jumping 25 percent this spring.

Gasoline rationing is expected within a month, with consumers so anxious about it, reported the Web site Ruz, financed by the Dutch government, that skirmishes broke out in long lines at some pumps on June 17.

Denis Leary once suggested Iran and Iraq be combined into a country called Irate. Not a bad idea given the news out of both Shia-dominant cynosures for misbehavior. But after the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, there's no doubting which one constitutes an "imminent" threat to the Middle East--and no, by that we don't just mean Israel.  We've focused a lot of editorial attention on what to do about the Islamic Republic's mad dash toward nuclearization. No one, with the possible exception of Justin Raimondo, considers such a prospect with equanimity, and yet our writers have been passionately divided over the subject of a preemptive strike on Iran's (known) uranium enrichment facilities. Contributors have also offered comical and grave alternatives for how to engage the would-be American pen pal Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in one of our most popular "Letters" series. With the U.S. presidential election looming, and a change in ...

Anyone remember the film Real Genius? I want to see Ahmadinejad bursting out of a Persian palace overflowing with popcorn.

Israel believes its newly-orbited Ofeq-7 satellite can track people and weapons in any targeted country, including Iran.

Israeli officials said Ofeq-7 contained a reconnaissance platform that could spot bottles on the floor. They said the camera payload could identify and send high-resolution images of items as small as 40 centimeters.

"We have a new camera that is as good as anything available, and that includes the United States," an official said.

Justin Raimondo believes, with emphatic certainty, that "Iran is no threat to Israel, and that there is no danger of Iran dropping nukes on Tel Aviv." Likewise he says that "Iran, with or without nuclear weapons, represents no threat to America." Far be it from me to take Mr. Raimondo seriously when he says such things – his contributions to last week's exchange were studded with so many hateful condemnations, bizarre declarations, and quarter-baked ideas that doing so would require me to empty my brain of everything I've learned about both the Middle East and foreign policy. But these two platitudes do serve as a good jumping-off point for discussing the true nature of the Iranian threat, which is, I believe, why the editors of Jewcy asked me to contribute to this debate.

Iran is indeed a threat to both the United States and to Israel – but the threat does not come in the cartoonish form of Mr. Raimondo's fevered imagination, with Iranian bombers nuking Tel Aviv and Iranian ICBM's rocketing their way toward New York. Those scenarios are red herrings intended to make Raimondo's task of turning America and Israel into the world's leading belligerents much easier.

The actual threat posed by a nuclear Iran involves the manner in which such a development would upset the balance of power in the Middle East, which no doubt for Mr. Raimondo is a boring subject as it does not provide ready opportunities for Israel Lobby hysteria and mushroom cloud fantasies. To understand the consequences of a nuclear Iran, we have to look to the recent history of Middle East power arrangements.

Before the American-Israeli alliance was solidified in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Middle East -- especially the eastern Mediterranean half of it -- was home to regular warfare. This bloodshed arose from the conviction among the Arab nations that they could destroy Israel, which they tried to do repeatedly: in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Even though some of the Arab countries were allied with the Soviet Union, Israel repulsed the invaders, and in the latter two wars even captured territory from the attacking armies. In doing so Israel created for itself a reputation as the most militarily competent country in its half of the region.

And then, as Martin Kramer explains, "the United States began to look at Israel as a potential strategic ally. Israel appeared to be the strongest, most reliable and most cost-effective bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Middle East. It could defeat any combination of Soviet clients on its own and, in so doing, humiliate the Soviet Union and drive thinking Arabs out of the Soviet camp."

In contrast to the benefits that Israel's victories provided the United States in its maneuverings against the Soviets, the 1973 war did create something of a crisis for America, in the form of the Arab oil embargo. Having suffered a gasoline shortage at home, American strategists decided to attempt to impose peace in the region by showing so much support for Israel that the Arab states would henceforth refuse to challenge it. And this strategy has been a resounding success: Since 1973 there have been no more wars between Israel and Arab countries. This security arrangement even ended up prying Egypt away from the Soviets and into an alliance, later joined by Jordan, with America.

What does all of this have to do with Iran today? It has to do with the Islamic Republic's prospects for success in its endeavor to undermine this American-enforced security architecture. Iran is trying to destabilize the Middle East by creating its own set of alliances and clients that it hopes will rival America's. This is why it funds Hezbollah in Lebanon and now Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories; has cultivated an alliance with Syria that seeks to engulf Lebanon and allow Hezbollah free reign there; and provides weapons, money, and leadership to insurgents in Iraq.

Iran's intentions are clear: it wants America out of the Middle East, so that it can control the Persian Gulf and manipulate the rest of the region through its alliances and proxies. Are these goals going to be easier or harder to accomplish with the benefit of nuclear deterrence? The answer is obvious, and it is the real reason why preventing a nuclear Iran is both in the American and Israeli interest. The short-term stakes, though, are higher for Israel (and Lebanon, for that matter). A nuclear Iran allied with Hezbollah to the north and Hamas and Islamic Jihad to the Southwest and East would dramatically embolden Israel's enemies, suppress foreign investment and tourism in Israel, and over time would cause the economic and psychological attrition of the Jewish state -- with no bombing runs over Tel Aviv necessary.

And so the true disappointment of Israel's war against Hezbollah last summer was its failure to act as a competent American client by dominating the part of the region it is responsible for keeping quiet. The war against Hezbollah was a particularly important conflict for Israel to win, because Hezbollah is more than just another disruptive presence in the Levant -- it is a vanguard force in the Iranian arsenal that is attempting to make American involvement in the region as costly as possible. It is one of the means by which Iran can summon a counterattack should the U.S. or Israel strike its nuclear facilities, and it is the primary asset of the Syrian-Iranian project to co-opt Lebanon, defeat the American-allied nascent democracy there, and bring uncontested Iranian power to Israel's northern border.

In one of his many dumb asides, Raimondo says that people who favor preventing Iran, by force if necessary, from acquiring nuclear weapons "don't have any compunction about throwing the entire region into chaos." This is probably the most wrong-headed of his many ridiculous assertions. Western acquiescence to a nuclear Iran would do perhaps more than anything else to throw the Middle East into chaos. It would shatter the balance of power that has governed the region, however shakily, for nearly forty years. Second-tier powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, would be sent scrambling for their own nuclear weapons and new alliances, and the United States would almost certainly be forced from the region. Raise your hand if you're in favor of handing over control of the U.S. economy to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Roughly at the same time he called Jews (not Zionists, mind you) "beastly people":

"If you think that by bombing and assassinating Palestinian leaders you are preparing ground for new attacks on Lebanon in the summer, I am telling you that you are seriously wrong," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told a rally in the city of Isfahan.