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What Happens To Neoconservatism After November? |
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by Daniel Koffler, June 9, 2008 |
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Jim Henley of Unqualified Offerings and The Art of the Possible has joined the conversation on neoconservatism and its future. He's skeptical about my claim that "[t]he neocons are in a decidedly weak position" and risk becoming marginalized in the likely event of a McCain defeat in November. And rightly so; what I should have said is that the neoconservatives are now in a weaker position than at any prior point in the history of their movement, which—to be fair—isn't the equivalent of being on the brink of dissolution. Jim ably outlines the reasons their total demise is not likely, which fall into roughly three groupings:
Unless Barack Obama really is the messiah, it stands to reason that regardless of what happens in November, theNot This Time neoconservatives will remain solidly in power in the Republican party for the foreseeable future, and will be poised to return to government in the event of either domestic or foreign misfortune.
To see why that assumption might nevertheless be wrong, let's make some careful discriminations.
First of all, retaining control of a defeated GOP is not equivalent to retaining a position next-in-line to control of government. Suppose that Obama and the Democrats win the presidential election convincingly and reduce the Republican congressional delegation to a rump caucus of the deep south and sun belt. In such a scenario, control of the GOP may be worth nothing or less than nothing.
Two-party systems are less stable than a cursory glance at their history suggests; the reason the same two parties have competed for control of the government for the last 150 years is because a series of distinct and incompatible institutions have succeeded each other in using the names "Democrats" and "Republicans." The Liberal Party of Britain, which under Gladstone was the party of the Empire and of the sun never setting, held a strong national majority just before WWI. The Liberals then committed Britain to a war that destroyed its empire, at the conclusion of which they were virtually wiped out and relegated to a small handful of seats in Parliament, persisting tenuously and irrelevantly in a kind of unlife for decades until they were absorbed by a splinter faction of Labour. So there is precedent for major parties, even major imperialist parties, to go belly up through democratic means. This is not to suggest that the Republican party itself is in danger of going out of business, but rather that it could be reduced to an ineffectual minority for the indefinite future (the demographic dynamics, in addition to everything else, look really bad for them), in which time there would potentially be space for some other party to become the Second Party. Moreover, if the Republican defeat makes the GOP sufficiently small, it could put the neocons on roughly even terms with factions antagonistic to them, and inspire allied factions (the anti-tax crowd, the Evangelicals, etc.) to break their tactical alignment with the neocons, since the downside of the social conservatives, Chamber of Commerce Bolsheviks, and the rest not caring enough about foreign policy to intervene in any way in what the neocons do, is that they have no incentive to maintain any cooperation once they no longer profit from doing so.
Second, let's explore what is meant by 'neoconservatism' and who the 'neocons' are. It's a tricky task, trickier than it has any right to be, not least because neoconservatives rarely use the term, and even then use it more frequently to insinuate that their opponents are conspiratorial anti-semites than to say anything informative about it, and also because neoconservatism is consciously constructed by its adherents to resist straightforward definition. So it's much easier to get a handle on what it is by defining it recursively, to borrow a concept from math.
Try this: Begin with the paradigmatic examples of contemporary neoconservatives— you're looking for surnames like "Kristol," "Kagan," and "Podhoretz" here; take the rank and file scriveners of the movement, like some of the writers at National Review, a larger proportion of Weekly Standard contributors, and virtually everyone who writes for Commentary; and finally use induction to fill in the cluster of beliefs that links the movement's archetypes to its ordinary membership. The first thing to notice is that the cluster of core neoconservative beliefs are quite few in number and consist largely in negations of various liberal norms, e.g.:
Those few beliefs, however, trade on thick, idiosyncratic concepts like "national will," which are imported from the philosophical canon but warped in transit and don't actually correspond to anything within it.
Minimal reflection on these points should demonstrate the absurdity of Robert Kagan's identification of neoconservatism with the whole of the internationalist tradition, in turn identified as the entire history of non-isolationist thought on foreign affairs. (Compare: Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes were both capitalists.) Because neoconservatism comprises negations of basic liberal norms, it fundamentally is not compatible with liberal internationalism. Yet neither is it immediately identifiable with just any sort of expansionist illiberal nationalism, because the thickness and idiosyncrasies of its concepts make it a poor fit—ultimately, an impossible fit, because it's a cosmopolitan belief system (albeit in a perverse way), and thus eschews various concepts of blood and soil that belong, in American political history, to the paleo tradition.
In other words, neoconservatism is a very small, idiosyncratic movement; and it is entirely a movement of intellectuals. There is no neoconservative constituency within the body of a democratic polity (nor can there be—as the Converse studies show, "mass publics" cannot, in practice, comprehend ideology at anything approaching the level of sophistication a genuine commitment to neoconservatism requires). This is quite unlike ideologies such as communism, libertarianism, populism, welfare liberalism, social conservatism, even single-issue dogmatic opposition to taxes; i.e., ideologies composed first and foremost of publicly accessible beliefs with immediate mass appeal. Indeed, the neoconservative universe is so small that it excludes individuals who at least at one time were prominently identified with the movement, like Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Francis Fukuyama. (What happened? The meaning of 'neoconservatism,' recursively defined by the beliefs of the neoconservatives, changed.)
Even within the movement, there is a detectable two-tiered hierarchy, a division between its theorists and its missionaries (which is true of any ideology). Hence someone like Kagan, Lawrence Kaplan, or even Paul Wolfowitz—informed, reflective thinkers, however one evaluates their thinking—is a different sort of neocon from the crew that blogs for Commentary, whose political philosophy, from what I can glean through my RSS feed, consists entirely in using and misusing words they don't know, alongside occasional sops to evolution denialism and global warming denialism, in the service of making their marginal contribution to destabilizing the globe and instigating wars. Which is to say that the true extension of robust neoconservative thought (i.e., excluding conceptually-confused, true-only-if-Gettierized propaganda) is even smaller than simple recursion suggests.
Neoconservatism is not unique for being an exclusively elite movement with limited membership. The same is true of foreign policy realism, a venerable technocratic system of belief, and there are any number of further examples (at least one for every specialized technical doctrine regarding a policy question or family of policy questions). It's hardly insidious in and of itself that neoconservatism, like realism but unlike communism and social conservatism, is strictly an intellectual movement—which is nothing but an instance of some of the Converse findings. Rather, it's just a fact that neoconservatism cannot, under any practically relevant circumstances, be a mass ideology. (What does distinguish it from other non-mass belief systems is the unusual extent to which, thanks to the Straussian influence, its adherents consciously revel in its public inaccessibility.) So the only way for it to be a successful movement on a large scale is by playing certain functional roles in a genuine mass ideology.
That's how neoconservatism provides the content of contemporary American nationalism. Its rejection of liberal norms, its belligerence, and especially its exceptionalism make it a suitable candidate for performing the function of giving nationalism a concrete platform to adhere to. But it's not the only suitable candidate for that role, and not even necessarily the most natural candidate, since it is at root a cosmopolitan ideology (though David Gelernter is working on fixing that). Hence Jim's point that there will always be nationalism wherever there's a nation is well-taken, but doesn't prejudice things in favor of neoconservatism retaining its dominant position. True blood and soil volkism can play the same role without importing anything from neoconservatism, though the result of that wouldn't exactly be an improvement on present circumstances.
On the other hand, various strains of paleoconservatism—which is much closer to being a mass ideology than neo-ism— especially the 'postmodern conservatism' James Poulos has been cultivating, reject elements of liberalism and provide grounds for national (or regional, or local) exceptionalism that are not bloodthirsty in either intent or effect. Likewise, the reformist conservatism of, say, Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam among others (Ramesh Ponnuru comes to mind as well), provides a motivation for grand unifying national projects and for fostering a spirit of special national purpose that has nothing to do with war. Which is to say that there are an array of candidate alternatives to neoconservatism for playing the role neoconservatism presently plays in American nationalism; and if any of them were to supersede neoconservatism as the intellectual movement that fills in the content of ineradicable non-liberal mass ideologies, the world would be a better, less violent place. Not necessarily because any of these alternatives is overwhelmingly compelling (none ultimately compelling to me; I'm a non-conservative cheering them along from the sidelines), but because making the world a better place relative to what neoconservatism has done is a fairly low bar to clear.
All of which is, I hope, an informative way of saying that Jim is right about point 1) that neocons are in a much stronger position structurally, tactically, and temperamentally than their GOP opponents and point 2) that the Republican factions opposed to the neocons are horrendously incompetent at the basic tasks of political organizing and too invested in internecine wars of purity, yet simultaneously too compromised by associations that the public, fairly or not, judges to be electoral non-starters, to mount a credible challenge to the neocons at this moment. Jim's point 3), however—that neoconservatism = American nationalism = the Republican party view writ large—comes apart on close scrutiny of what neoconservatism is. If it's just a catch-all for any illiberal, aggressive, exceptionalist theory of international relations, then it is indeed firmly ensconced not only in the Republican party but in America as a whole; but the perpetuation of neoconservatism so understood is therefore compatible with the fall and marginalization of the actual power players and centers of neoconservatism.
Alternatively, if neoconservatism is the ideology describable by recursion on the beliefs (sincere beliefs, that is, not doublethink or Straussian exoteric deceit) of Bill Kristol, Robert Kagan, John Bolton, Norman Podhoretz, Joe Lieberman, Paul Wolfowitz, et al., then all that prejudices our politics in favor of neoconservatism are the movement's comparative strengths, and the comparative weaknesses of internal opposition to it within the GOP. But the neocons' strengths and their Republican opponents' weaknesses are contingent qualities. The balance of power could easily tilt the other way under different circumstances. That fact provides a rationale, the only rationale I can think of at this late date, for continuing to identify as a Republican and participate in the party's internal debates, namely helping some congenial wing of the paleocons or the burgeoning reformists (I suspect that libertarian desertion of the party is too far advanced at this point for the libertarians to play a meaningful role in such disputes anymore) take control of the party's foreign policy apparatus from the neoconservatives. That would be, as my people say, תיקון עולם.
For these same reasons, ultimately, I don't share Jim's pessimism. Nationalism may be ineradicable without the eradication of the state, but that doesn't mean it's static and impossible to influence. In particular, it doesn't always have to be what it is now; in fact, it's palpably less confident, aggressive, and smothering (though perhaps by the same token more desperate) than it was even four years ago. As Ezra Klein perceptively noted a while back, the shift in the musical backdrop for this election compared to the last one is a telling analogue to the clearer air this year.
In their attempt to maintain a grip on power, the neoconservatives will of course, as Jim writes, deploy a Dolchstoßlegende; but the move isn't guaranteed to work, and in this case, the odds may well be against it, because the targets of the backstabbing allegation wouldn't just be sinister unnamed internal aliens, but the vast majority of Americans. Likewise, Jim lists the neocons' energetic commitment to foreign policy, which far outstrips that of any other GOP factions, as one of their key strengths. Not only that, but the narrowness of their agenda—their sublime indifference, at least in outward expression, to the outcome of key disputes in the party over domestic and social policy (they'd just go with the winning side in the end)—allowed them to leverage a dominant position in the party's foreign policy apparatus. What happens, though, if a monomanical dedication to a narrow foreign policy agenda becomes a political weakness?
In other words, what if—what if?—a new administration ends the war; abruptly puts a stop to its predecessor's crude and badly misplaced Hegelian language of world-historical conflicts (and also its predecessor's war crimes); quietly wages the police campaign that should have begun years ago to put al Qaeda out of business, while delivering free trade, investment in energy development, and international markets to Iran in exchange for liberalizing reforms in the society and curtailment of nuclear research; restores comprehensive arms control and establishes a comprehensive non-proliferation framework; and devotes the bulk of its attention to economic, environmental, good government, and energy supply reforms? What if that new administration comes to power by exclaiming—again and again and again and again—the need to "end the mindset that got us into war"?
What if that new administration comes to power on the strength of a resounding victory over the most prominent and vociferous exponent of neoconservatism in American political life? Without the the leader of the free world and his ministers sternly and ominously preaching Apocalypse from the West Wing every day, without the TV issuing color-coded directives about when to become terrified, with the nation's attention finally turned away from fighting World War ℵ0, who will be there to listen to or care about the lie that Glorious Triumph was ordained to happen 6 months after t (where t=whatever time it is now)? Who will listen or care, apart from anti-warriors on both the right and left who won't have forgotten what the weasels did to our Constitution, to 4000 of our people, and hundreds of thousands of another country's people?
Nothing is guaranteed, of course, but the neocons can be defeated and marginalized, either by internal opponents within the GOP taking control, or else, if they can't be dislodged from their perch in the party, then by marginalizing the party itself. (What would a marginalized neoconservative movement look like? That it would be riven by internecine fighting is a near given, but beyond that the example of the realists is instructive. Like the neocons, the realists had no actual constituency; once the neocons superseded them as the party's technocratic elite, the realists were reduced to a small cohort of living fossils, many of whom are happy to align themselves with the neocons for a whiff of power. The moral is that there is no total redemption, and that crowd in particular is as resilient as zombies. Given enough time, they may rehabilitate themselves. But any period in which they are irrelevant and ignored is reason to cheer.)
The circumstances on the ground after a McCain defeat, especially a convincing McCain defeat, will be unlike anything the neoconservative movement has experienced. The trajectory of their prominence and influence has been uniformly upwards from the foundation of their movement, but not until this administration became a war presidency—not even under Ronald Reagan, whose greatest triumphs were knowing when to cut losses in Lebanon, and peacefully winding down the Cold War through a combination of diplomacy and spending, for which, recall, the neocons thanked him with a little Dolchstoßlegende (of course)—did they get to wield true power and put their theory into practice. We all know the rest.
Had they been less adroit in forming coalitions and accumulating power, had the realists been more alert to the threat to their position, had the neocons not been so fluent in adopting the language of humanitarian interventionism to sweet-talk the liberal hawks who ultimately eviscerated the opposition to the war preemptively (though that's another story); had they, in short, been less successful as a party-building movement, they might never have gotten to hold the reins of power. Now, thanks to their own catastrophic success, to borrow a phrase, we can clean up their toxic influence on our democracy. Maybe we won't succeed, but for the first time in a long time, we can succeed, not just at putting the crooks out of business, but at bankrupting the ideology that fueled the crimes. Yes, we can.
please save jewcy
nice try, but the neo-cons are liberal internationalists. They support a democratic order and free markets without regard to nationality. They are proponents (as you say) of universal ethical norms. These norms are not based on ethnicity or nation. The only real difference between the neo-cons and liberals is the means they prefer to arriving to this internationalist liberal world order. the neo-cons favor a more hard-line approach and don't shy away from war. Liberals prefer negotiations and diplomacy.
both liberals and neo-cons stand in stark contrast to realist who do not recognize any international norms such as democracy. The realist are for national interest and balance of power. It is the realist who are the nationalist. The neo-cons are in fact radical anti-nationalist in that the will pursue any means necessary to implement their internationalist order.
There are basically three reasons why the neo-cons are not going away. One: the realists analysis relies on the supremacy of the nation state, but in our world of al-qeadas and hezbollahs, non-state actors wield considerable power and the realists' analysis cannot deal with this.
Two: In the age of nuclear proliferation and radical terror organizations, many americans feel that reliance on negotiations and diplomacy simply is not good enough.
And three: This is probably the most important reason why neo-cons are not going away. Although there can and should be a liberal response to the neo-cons, too many liberals (like koffler) do not deal with the neo-cons in an intellectually honest manner. The neo-cons are an off shoot of the left (many of them have socialist roots) and they share many of the same ideals of liberals. Until liberals accept this and learn to deal with it they will never be able to challenge the neo-cons. Articles like this which claim that neo-cons are actually nationalists and not internationalists simply equate neo-cons with everything bad (ie nationalism illiberalism etc) but do not honestly deal with neo-con thought. The neo-cons are popular because of their universalist, internationalist, and liberal positions. If you do not acknowledge that you cannot undermine its base.
There was a time when jewcy's editors were against lazy attacks on neo-cons. What happened to you guys? what happened to signing the Euston Manifesto? You guys used to offer a new perspective. An intellectually honest and truly liberal perspective. If there was a way to deal with the neo-cons you were the hope. what happened?
Anonymous
If using international law one way to justify ignoring international law another way is "internationalist", & co-signing rendition, torture, and warrantless domestic spying are "liberal", then both internationalism and liberalism are worthless.
There's truth in that the neo-cons are an offshoot of the left. But that left root was Trotsky, he of the Global Endless Revolution. Liberalism & Trotskyism are incompatible.
please save jewcy
torture and domestic spying are not the principles that give the neo-cons appeal nor are they the ideas that distinguish neo-cons from other intellectual movements. The neo-con idea that makes the movement both popular and important is the idea that spreading democracy is in the best interest of the US and of the world. This is based upon the idea of the democratic peace theory. This theory states that democracies have not and will not fight each other and it is a staple of liberal/idealist international theory. The neo-cons argue that spreading democracy will lead to world peace. This is the neo-con argument that one needs to deal with. Reducing their ideas to torture or domestic spying thereby truncating the attractive aspects of the neo-con ideology will not be effective in turing people away from the movement. The people that are attracted to the neo-cons are attracted because of the liberal and ethical arguements the neo-cons make.
I hope I am not giving the wrong impression. I am not a neo-con. I am a proud liberal. I think the neo-cons are not going to be able to implement their ideas because they are to arrogant and too hawkish. A liberal democratic order will only be achieved when Americans decide to invest in the health and education of the rest of the world. It will be a long and slow process but that is the way toward democratization and a liberal world order. That is the argument we need to be having. if we portray the neo-cons as illiberal or nationalist they will win every time, because those arguments are lazy. They are easily refuted and they do not address the attractive aspects of neo-con ideology.
Daniel Koffler
This really just goes to show that you can make anything look like anything else by assessing it sufficiently abstractly, or more generally, as David Lewis wrote, "Any two things share infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many others. That is so whether the two things are perfect duplicates or utterly dissimilar." Liberalism is fundamentally incompatible with neoconservative doctrine on the justification of the use of force, the goals, rules, and norms of international diplomacy, and superpower exceptionalism (and consequent lifting of moral constraints on action).
For a long time, lots of socialists and communists liked to say that the regimes established under socialist and communist auspices didn't really represent socialism and communism. Whatever. I'm not interested in the Platonic form of socialism, and also not interested in the Platonic form of neoconservatism.
I am particularly interested in your waving away of the significance of neoconservatism's first-order justification of torture and other war crimes, and second-order justification of trashing the liberal diplomatic regime proscribing torture and other war crimes, by saying that they are not part of neoconservatism's "appeal."
So it's that simple, huh? The fact that such outrageous, illiberal moral exceptionalism is unappealing to you (as a proud liberal) means it's not a salient feature of neoconservatism. But the democracy-promotion agenda, which does appeal to your liberalism, is salient. Just not enough to come down from the realm of abstracta to take a look at the conduct neoconservatism licenses in the name of 'democracy-promotion'.
please save jewcy
lets start with this:
"Liberalism is fundamentally incompatible with neoconservative doctrine on the justification of the use of force, the goals, rules, and norms of international diplomacy, and superpower exceptionalism (and consequent lifting of moral constraints on action)."
Bill Clinton's foreign policy was unmistakably liberal yet that did not stop him from intervening militarily in the former Yugoslavia (without the approval of the UN) and he continued the Somalia mission that he inherited. In fact he was criticized by the right for his willingness to intervene militarily. Liberalism does not rule out military action. We can go all the way back to Kennedy or even Wilson and see that things such as "superpower exceptionalism" exist in liberal ideas and policy. the neo-cons differ from liberals only in matter of degree. They certainly are not incompatible as you state. Liberalism is not military isolationism.
Second, I don't wave off neo-con justification of torture and other war crimes simply because they don't appeal to me. They simply are not important aspects of neo-con ideology. Show my one book by a neo-con where justifications for torture and war crimes form the thesis. Focusing on these issues is like focusing on Rwanda and then reducing liberalism down the failure to intervene there. That would ignore the reason why people are attracted to liberalism and it would also not be an accurate depiction of liberalism as an IR theory. It is easy to pick out the negative aspects of an ideology or to highlight an instance where proponents of that ideology do not act as they should. It is much more difficult to deal with the arguments as the proponents of an ideology profess them. Too often liberals use neo-con as a catch-all for any negative aspect of US policy, but rarely do they actually deal with neo-con arguments. Koffler here does not deal with neo-con thought. He simply picks and choses minor aspects of neo-con ideas and then redefines neo-con ideology based on his cherry picking. He completely ignores neo-con ideology as the neo-cons them selves portray it. This is the challenge for liberals and it is a foundation of intellectual history, to understand intellectual movements on their own terms not how they are defined by their critics. It was a challenge that Jewcy used to undertake. Not anymore.
What happened to articles like this:
http://www.jewcy.com/feature/2007-06-18/rise_of_the_faux_cialists
or
http://www.jewcy.com/feature/2007-08-28/mutiny_on_the_manifesto
Where is the intellectual rigor?
Daniel Koffler
Again, abstract away sufficiently far from any divergent views and they look identical. Of course liberalism doesn't rule out military intervention. It establishes norms by which military action can be justified, and in the absence of which it can't. Neoconservatism presumptively rejects those norms.
We can go all the way back to Kennedy or even Wilson and see that things such as "superpower exceptionalism" exist in liberal ideas and policy. the neo-cons differ from liberals only in matter of degree.
I think you'll find that continuity between Wilson and Kennedy foreign policy is quite tenuous, but in any event, liberalism treats superpowers as exceptional in the sense of having international obligations that less powerful states do not have. It does not treat them as exempted, by their inherently good nature, from the moral constraints that govern the rest of the world.
Second, I don't wave off neo-con justification of torture and other war crimes simply because they don't appeal to me. They simply are not important aspects of neo-con ideology.
Well, you wave them off for some reason. I'll come back to the suggestion that they're not important aspects of neocon ideology. But let's see:
Focusing on these issues is like focusing on Rwanda and then reducing liberalism down the failure to intervene there. That would ignore the reason why people are attracted to liberalism
Two problems: 1) What's the scope of 'people'? It can't be all people (or even all Americans) because, as Philip Converse and subsequent researchers have shown, it is for all practical purposes impossible for any belief set as theory-laden as liberal IR to appeal to a mass public. So I think we're back to talking about what appeals to intellectuals. Well, thumping the idea of democracy promotion (always from an armchair rationalist perspective, mind you) undoubtedly gave neoconservative views a purchase among liberal hawks. On the other hand, the justifications of torture, war crimes, and destroying the liberal international order prohibiting same --- packaged in a nationalist framework and sold to the public as a question of standing up for American prerogatives against meddling foreigners --- are a large factor on neoconservatism attaining whatever indirect mass appeal it enjoys.
2) Can you identify a single liberal internationalist who argued that the abandonment of Rwanda was a good thing? The Clinton administration, like any government, was a mishmash of competing ideologies. Sometimes, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, Clinton policies were tokens of liberal internationalism. Other times, as in the Clinton administration's abandonment of Rwanda, they were tokens of foreign policy realism.
Conversely, first-order justifications of torture and war crimes and second-order justifications of destroying the liberal international system that proscribes torture and war crimes are most definitely core features of neoconservatism as practiced by neoconservative thinkers. Here's Charles Krauthammer's defense of torture. Here's Paul Wolfowitz's (1992) argument for abandoning liberal norms governing the international conduct.
Koffler here does not deal with neo-con thought. He simply picks and choses minor aspects of neo-con ideas and then redefines neo-con ideology based on his cherry picking.
Incorrect, I deal with the neocon thought that actually exists. You're dealing with the neocon thought of a Platonic realm that doesn't exist.
Too often liberals use neo-con as a catch-all for any negative aspect of US policy, but rarely do they actually deal with neo-con arguments.
This is a preposterous misreading. 1) I'm not a liberal (except in the sense of being a classical liberal). 2) The scope of my critique is manifestly restricted narrowly to neocon arguments, not the universe of negative aspects of US policy.
August Esch
Mr. Koffler, your claim that torture is a core feature of neoconservatism is in utter contradiction with your claim that John McCain is the "most prominent and vociferous exponent of neoconservatism in American political life." If claim #2 is true then claim #1 is false, because, as most people know (including Charles Krauthammer in that article you linked to purporting to prove the centrality of torture in neocon thought), John McCain is one of the most prominent and vociferous opponents of the use of torture in the war on terrorism. If claim #1 is true then John McCain is certainly no neocon, in which case you'll have to find some other warmongering cabal for him to be a member of.
Let me help you resolve this contradiction: support for the use torture has never been a "core feature" of neocon thought; it is an opinion that sprung up organically after 9/11 following the Bush administration's decision to take extralegal means in order to hunt down alleged terrorists and prevent possible terrorist acts. The legal arguments arose around the definition of unlawful combatants in the Geneva conventions; as we know, the Bush administration decided that terrorists were unlawful combatants and thus not subject to the Geneva protections, etc., etc. Now, regardless of the legality and accuracy of this position, it was naturally appealing to many supporters of the wars inside the administration and outside, including many avowed neocons, because it seemed to give the US an advantage to counter the terrorists blatant flaunting and/or complete disregarding of the rules of war. The main point: all of this happened after 9/11; neoconservatism was born well before 9/11. Those neocons that support torture do so on their own initiative; it was never a doctrine of neoconservatism. If you want that doctrine, look up PNAC. You won't find support of torture as one of their core goals, trust me.
Daniel Koffler
please save jewcy
let's start with a basic principle in thestudy of ideology. I mentioned it above but since you ignored it I willbring it up again: In dealing with an idea it is important to define it as theproponents of that idea understand it. Just as it is for Jews to defineJudaism, liberals to define liberalism, conservatives to define conservativismor Muslims to define Islam, it is up to the neo-cons to define what it means tobe neo-conservative. Non-muslims cannot and should not define Islam forthe Muslims. Non-Jews cannot and should not define Judaism for the Jews andNon-neo-cons cannot and should not define what it means to be aneo-conservative and so forth and so forth. Your arguments arebased solely on those who criticize the neo-cons. Neo-cons do not putforth a nationalist ideology, they do not think that torture and war crimes arecentral tenants of their ideology. You have redefined what it means to beneo-con for the neo-cons.
But lets deal with some of yourspecific arguments.
"liberalism treats superpowers as exceptional in the senseof having international obligations that less powerful states do not have. Itdoes not treat them as exempted, by their inherently good nature, from themoral constraints that govern the rest of the world."
I think that the neo-cons would not seeany distinction between these two ideas. They would argue that becausethe US is a super power it is (to use your language for liberalism)"exceptional in the sense of having international obligations that lesspowerful states do not have." They argue that these obligationsinclude what one of the founders of international liberalism, Woodrow Wilson,claimed was the duty of the US... namely "Making the world safe fordemocracy." This is a liberal principle, and the neo-cons view itas an obligation which comes along with the status of superpower, which youyour self say is a liberal trait. This was their reason for going intoIraq.
then you state:
"I think you'll find that continuity between Wilson andKennedy foreign policy is quite tenuous"
They both supported the spread ofdemocracy and liberalism. This is opposed to the other main school of IRtheory, realism, that does not care for spreading democracy becauseit is only concerned with national interest. The realist are only concernedwith US national interest...they are nationalist and they don’t care if therest of the world is made up of brutal dictatorships. As you should be able tosee, the neo-cons are much closer to the liberals on this than they are to thenationalist or realist.
I claimed that I did not simply wave offtorture and war crimes because they dont appeal to liberals. and youstated:
"Well, you wave them off for somereason."
In this you are right, but if youlook at my post you will see that I argued they are not an importantaspect of neo-con ideology as the neo-cons define it. I challenged you toproduce one book where torture and war crimes form the thesis. You stillhave not. I asked you to provide a book for a reason… one article does notprove your point. One article byKrauthammer does not prove that it is a central tenant of eno-con thought. The Wolfowitz article you providedisn’t even by Wolfowitz! Its byDick Cheney, who in the early 90s was realist not a neo-con.
You claim:
"I deal with the neocon thought that actuallyexists."
This is incorrect. Neither of us deals with something as it actually exists. There isno single truth in the study of ideology. No one has the monopoly on howsomething “actually exists.” I, however am conforming to theaccepted academic norm of dealing with neo-con thought, as theythemselves understand it. You are allowing its critics to define it forthem. That is a method used in propaganda not inserious intellectual debate.
you ask:
"Can you identify a single liberalinternationalist who argued that the abandonment of Rwanda was a goodthing?"
Yes, please see the research ofChristian Davenport. http://web.mac.com/christiandavenport/iWeb/Christian%20Davenport/Enter.htmlHeis a professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and hehas done considerable research on Rawanda. He argues that there wereliberals in the Clinton admin that could not figure out who were the "goodguys" and who were the "bad guys." They did not know whoseside to take so they decided that is was better to do nothing. Many of them still hold this view. This reluctance to act is evident inliberal thought in a number of cases: The EU liberals in former Yugoslavia, theUS in Rwanda and everyone in Darfor. But to reduce liberalism down to this critique is as intellectually lazyas reducing neo-con ideas down to torture and war crimes. It is defining anideology by the critics of that ideology instead of by how the proponents actuallyportray it. And this should also answer your question as to who are "people." When defining liberalism, the "people" are liberals. When defining neo-con ideology the "people" that are important are the neo-cons themselves, not the critics of the neo-cons.
please save jewcy
sorry for the problem of spaces in the above post. I wrote it in word and somehow when i pated it in the comment box it erased some of the spaces
Daniel Koffler
Uh-huh. Um, why not just write in the comment box next time? But anyway, since we're now talking in circles, I'll wrap up.
liberalism treats superpowers as exceptional in the senseof having international obligations that less powerful states do not have. Itdoes not treat them as exempted, by their inherently good nature, from themoral constraints that govern the rest of the world."
I think that the neo-cons would not see any distinction between these two ideas.
Hard to say whether they would or wouldn't, but the distinction is clear and decisive.
I think you'll find that continuity between Wilson and Kennedy foreign policy is quite tenuous
They both supported the spread of democracy and liberalism.Did they also support literacy? Once again, at a sufficient level of abstraction, everything is identical.
I deal with the neocon thought that actually exists.
This is incorrect. Neither of us deals with something as it actually exists. There is no single truth in the study of ideology. No one has the monopoly on how something “actually exists.” I, however am conforming to the accepted academic norm of dealing with neo-con thought, as they themselves understand it. You are allowing its critics to define it for them. That is a method used in propaganda not inserious intellectual debate.
I thought for a moment this was getting into some interesting Kantian epistemological territory, but no. Recall my method for defining neoconservatism:
Begin with the paradigmatic examples of contemporary neoconservatives— you're looking for surnames like "Kristol," "Kagan," and "Podhoretz" here; take the rank and file scriveners of the movement, like some of the writers at National Review, a larger proportion of Weekly Standard contributors, and virtually everyone who writes for Commentary; and finally use induction to fill in the cluster of beliefs that links the movement's archetypes to its ordinary membership.
That's analogous to the recursive method in mathematics; it's strictly empirical and inductive. There's no one "academic norm" for analyzing an ideology, but there are three broad options: 1) Proceed a priori from some Platonic conception of what the ideology is; any (sufficiently significant) deviation from that Platonic conception is therefore not an instance of the ideology. 2) Define the ideology as whatever its proponents say it is. 3) Define the ideology as the cluster of beliefs its proponents advocate.
You're hopping between (1) and (2), each of which is inadequate for several evident reasons. (In case (2), the problem is that it's unstable; either it becomes (1) (only with the proponents rather than the analyst stating the Platonic conception), or if empiricism is the order of the day, it gives way to (3), which cuts out the unnecessary and potentially misleading filter (e.g., if the proponents are misrepresenting or mischaracterizing their position or stating it from so high a level of abstraction --- see above --- as to uniquely define nothing) and goes straight to the unfiltered belief set the proponents advocate.)
Since (3) seems to me the only tenable option, it's the only one I use. But I'm not interested in semantic quibbling, so I disown my claim to the term 'neoconservatism', which you can now feel free to define any way you choose (e.g., 'neoconservatism' = 'Fraggle Rock'.) Henceforth I'll strictly concern myself with 'neoconservatism*', defined recursively by the belief set actually existing neoconservatives advocate.
please save jewcy
now we are getting somewhere....
You stat that one method of defining an ideology is: "3) Define the ideology as the cluster of beliefs its proponents advocate. "
and that "3) seems to me the only tenable option, it's the only one I use. "
Now we have an argument. you absolutely do not use this methodology. that is the whole point. yes you did say to read ""Kristol," "Kagan," and "Podhoretz" here; take the rank and file scriveners of the movement, like some of the writers at National Review, a larger proportion of Weekly Standard contributors, and virtually everyone who writes for Commentary; "
but not a single one of those sources would agree with almost any of your arguments... NONE of them would claim that neo-cons are nationalist. NONE of them would argue that torture or war crimes from a central tenant of their arguments. so where are you getting your "cluster" of beliefs? I am not defining neo-conservatism... the authors that you mention are. I am only trying to deal with their arguments. you are making up arguments for them... that they are nationalists... that the central tenants of their ideology are torture and war crimes. then after you redefine their ideology you proceed from that.
This does not have to be a circular argument... just show me a neo-con that thinks any of the things you say they think and we will be done. dont give me a report by dick cheney and try to pass it off as a wolfowitz report and dont give me one short off the cuff article here or there. give me real substantive work, such as a book where a neo-con puts forth a thesis that calls for torture, war crimes or nationalism.
and one other point... spreading democracy and liberalism vs balance of power and supporting authoritarian regimes is the main question that has defined IR theory for the past 75 years. Literacy has played almost no role.
Daniel Koffler
No, again, you're confusing (3) with (2). The whole point is that the ways proponents of an ideology characterize it --- particularly when they are notoriously unreliable political operatives --- present a potentially misleading filter that is especially unnecessary when the beliefs they advocate are readily available. (If you can find me one neoconservative criticism of the Krauthammer justification of torture which, IIRC, was hugely popular among neoconservatives because it accurately reflects their beliefs, then I'd be impressed.) Uniformly embracing torture and war crimes, and second-order uniformly embracing a trashing of the liberal order regarding diplomacy, the initiation of war, and conduct in war, and doing so, moreover, as a linchpin of political strategy, does indeed strike as a very salient feature for any ideology to have. The fact that some of its proponents have also written books arguing for creating utopia (small text: by means of violating the liberal international order in numerous ways, as well as violating liberal principles of civil rights protection, and in general, extreme violence) doesn't conflict with, indeed, provides the abstract basis for the embrace of torture and war crimes.
Last thing I forgot to mention re: liberalism and Rwanda. What you've got there isn't a justification of inaction on liberal grounds, but an excuse for what is acknowledged to be a failure of liberal principles. (Compare: I might be justified in killing a man in self-defense. I might be excused for killing a man for reasons of insanity. But never the other way around.)
please save jewcy
you state:
"The whole point is that the ways proponents of an ideology characterize it --- particularly when they are notoriously unreliable political operatives --- present a potentially misleading filter that is especially unnecessary when the beliefs they advocate are readily available."
If the "beliefs they advocate are readily available." Then please give me a good example. The beliefs you are assigning to them are not "readily available" because they do not exit anywhere except in the minds of their critics. If they are then ... I will ask again... please give me some evidence... a book, a report...
next:
"What you've got there isn't a justification of inaction on liberal grounds, but an excuse for what is acknowledged to be a failure of liberal principles"
exactly, but to reduce liberalism down to this critique as you reduce neo-conservatism down to the critiques of its critics is too miss the whole point of what liberalism or neo-conservatism is.
Daniel Koffler
1) I swear to God this is mind-bogglingly easy. 15 minutes max with google will tell you everything you could ever want to know about neoconservative views on torture and war-crimes, on the justifications for war, on the rules of diplomacy, and on the merits of the liberal international system that prohibits torture and war crimes, narrowly defines the justifications for war, and delineates the rules of diplomacy. The Frum-Perle book I just linked to presents an argument for abandoning the last. The Krauthammer article I just linked to addresses all the rest. (I ought to have mentioned previously the way you wave away the Krauthammer piece as insignificant, pay no further attention, and then suggest I've offered no examples. That's startling. The Krauthammer piece is explicitly packaged as a major neconservative think piece in the pre-eminent neoconservative journal.) There are countless repetitions of this sort of thing. (There's a bloggingheads episode where Eli Lake discusses the merits of extraordinary rendition at length. I mention that strictly because I was watching it yesterday and remains fresh in my memory. It's a dime a dozen. No I'm not going to dig it up for you. You can find it while you're looking for other things.) And on and on and on. There's a glut of stuff to look at; go at it! (I also noticed that you've modulated from conceding that neoconservatives defend torture and war crimes while downplaying the significance to now arguing that they don't do so at all. You were closer to right initially.)
2) No, this is a major equivocation. I have argued a) that neoconservatism justifies torture, war crimes, junking the liberal international order, etc. all the rest I won't repeat again, on the grounds that neoconservatives justify all of those things. You argue that that's not important; I disagree and there's the impasse. Conversely, you've offered up b) an example not of liberalism justifying the abandonment of Rwanda, but of people making excuses for failures to live up to liberal principles.
In a) the questionable conduct is presented as justified by neoconservative principles. In b) the questionable conduct is not presented as justifed by liberal principles (rather, the opposite). The comparison is entirely inapt.
Daniel Koffler
I just wrote:
I ought to have mentioned previously the way you wave away the Krauthammer piece as insignificant, pay no further attention, and then suggest I've offered no examples. That's startling. The Krauthammer piece is explicitly packaged as a major neconservative think piece in the pre-eminent neoconservative journal.
I further concede that if articles written in the Weekly Standard are disallowed as evidence of what neoconservatives think, my task will be made harder.
Daniel Koffler
Oh last thing: I completely forgot the domestic illiberalism. Over the last 7 years, the Bush administration has adopted a position that the president is a elected dictator whose powers are in effect limitless because they are absolute with respect to any matter of war or security and the president's judgment of what is or isn't a matter of war or security is the final and unreviewable word on it. Needless to say, that is not a view compatible with liberalism.
Because there is a surfeit of material to show that neoconservatives agree with this position (esp. in re: detention, wiretapping, etc. etc.), can you provide a single example of someone we both would regard as a neoconservative in good standing taking a position against any of the administration's arrogations of power?
please save jewcy
I never said that neocons do not allow torture, but that is not how this argument started. you argued that torture, war crimes and nationalism are CENTRAL to neo-con ideology. I have never denied that neo-cons do support torture. I have continually argued that you are reducing the neocons down to this one MINOR aspect of their ideology and that you are ignoring almost all of the neocons' substantive arguments. Torture and war crimes have never been a focal point for neocons and you have produced no evidence to the contrary. Yes the weekly standard is a good place to read neocon thought, but one article is simply insufficient to say that it is CENTRAL to their thought. As you said you need a "cluster." And this you have not provided. Because the central tenants of neocon ideology are the spread of democracy. This is the subject of almost all their major works. It is an idea with liberal roots and here they put forth an argument that needs to be dealt with seriously. But you chose to ignore any aspect of neocon ideology that has any substance and revert back to MINOR points which you find convenient. This is lazy.
Here is a WSJ version of a Commentary piece on why neoconservatism has a future. This is the subject we started with....
http://www.opinionjournal.com/federation/feature/?id=110010684
It is not about torture or war crimes, and it certainly is not about nationalism because the neocons are not nationalist. It argues that the neocon ideas of spreading peace through spreading democracy are the only realistic policies that the next president will have. I dont agree with them but i recognize that we should deal with their arguments. Knee jerk reactions that try to depict them as nationalist, or yelling torture and war crimes in no way deals with their arguments. Jewcy used to be one of the only publications that dealt with these arguments.
Daniel Koffler
I have continually argued that you are reducing the neocons down to this one MINOR aspect of their ideology and that you are ignoring almost all of the neocons' substantive arguments.
Putting 'minor' in all caps doesn't make support for torture minor.
Yes the weekly standard is a good place to read neocon thought, but one article is simply insufficient to say that it is CENTRAL to their thought. As you said you need a "cluster." And this you have not provided.
Really, haven't I? But then why do you concede:
I never said that neocons do not allow torture
Unless you yourself were familiar with neoconservatives' support for torture. Either you're trying to read minds, or you know as well as I do that it takes an internet connection and a tiny investment of time to turn up rafts of neoconservative support for torture. I've pointed you to a number of sources now; I'm not doing any more work for you.
Because the central tenants of neocon ideology are the spread of democracy.
The central tenants of neocon ideology are the residents of the Weekly Standard building, but 'spread of democracy' is abstract to the point of meaninglessness. Opposition to 'democracy' construed maximally broadly is virtually non-existent in the west; conversely, support for the idea that the entire world would be better off if it were democratic is virtually unanimous. The question is, what means of working towards democratization are a) permissible, b) productive, and c) at minimum, don't fatally undermine democracy promotion from the outset (e.g., by establishing a regime of torture and secret prisons).
"Neoconservatism and liberalism both support democracy promotion" is less informative than "John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman were both capitalists."
please save jewcy
if you cannot understand the difference between minor and central, then i will try to explain. A central tenant would be one that forms the thesis of books, major reports and appears regularly in articles. A minor point would be one that you can find but is not a major tenant of an ideology. Torture and war crimes are not even ideologies in that they are not a goal onto themselves. They are a means to an end. That end, which for the neo-cons is the spread of a democratic order, is the real ideology. And that ideology is what the neocons focus on. This end is based on the liberal idea of democratic peace theory. You have now discussed the neocons and their relevance for two days and you have not been able to bring yourself to mention what their end is. Doing so would force you to deal with a serious argument. Instead you lazily reduce the neocons to one or two minor aspects of their thought which you find easy to argue against. Or you try to (and i still don't understand where you got this) misrepresent their ideology as nationalist.
The fact that neoconservatism is an offshoot of liberalism is very important and very informative. It shows that there is more to what they think than torture, war crimes and nationalism. But you do not want to acknowledge that. Only when you do will you be able to produce a decent refutation. FOr now you are left with knee jerk reactions.
Daniel Koffler
Extending:
I have continually argued that you are reducing the neocons down to this one MINOR aspect of their ideology and that you are ignoring almost all of the neocons' substantive arguments.
So: You concede that support for torture is an element of neoconservatism. That is wise; neoconservatives support torture. Classical liberals, welfare liberals, libertarians, social democrats, and (I believe) paleoconservatives do not. The discrepancy is not coincidental. What this comes down to is your insistence that this aspect of neoconservative ideology is 'minor' (or even 'MINOR'). It's unclear to me what leads you to say that, but please feel free to take 'minor' and 'major' and do what you will with them. I'll now define 'major*' as applying to any aspect of an ideology that distinguishes it from every other ideology in its time and place.
Also:
it certainly is not about nationalism because the neocons are not nationalist.
Again, let's see what the neoconservatives have to say. Here are Frum and Perle promoting the idea of destroying the liberal order in order to save it, on the grounds that America is an exceptional state entitled to do so. An interesting claim. Liberals generally would agree America is better than many other states, but in virtue of American governing values (broad civil liberties, democracy, an equitable judicial system, etc.). Frum and Perle are not entitled to do so because of their support for the negation of such governing values in the form of unlimited executive authority, torture, war crimes, suspension of habeas corpus, etc. What they can appeal to is some rationally inaccessible property of inherent goodness America somehow has; or in short, nationalism. Hence, David Gelernter steps in to provide the content of that nationalism again and again and again. He does so in the Weekly Standard and Commentary where he is celebrated for doing so. Of course neoconservatism is nationalist. I can't honestly grok the notion that anyone thinks otherwise.
Daniel Koffler
Ellipses simply contracting connected points into a single sentence:
Torture and war crimes are...a means to...the spread of a democratic order
Hence neoconservatism is an illiberal ideology. QED.
please save jewcy
"You concede that support for torture is an element of neoconservatism. "
I never denied that neo-cons support torture. I said that it was not central to their ideology and that you are lazily ignoring the central aspects of neocon ideology and instead focusing on minor aspects that you find more convenient. I see that you are not just happy with defining the neocons' arguements for them, you also want to have me argue something that I never did. There is a difference between claiming that something does not exist at all and arguing that something is a not a major aspect of an ideology but you have now changed my argument from me claiming that torture and war crimes are not central neocon thought to having me claim that they dont exist at all. Then you proceed to argue with from this false premiss.
Further your argument that these methods that the neocons approve of are central to its ideology is a bit like arguing that Hamas' ideology is terror. Sure Hamas uses terror as a means but that certainly does not define their ideology. If someone wants to deal seriously with Hamas' ideology he would have to get beyond its use of terror and see what they really want. In the same way you have not gone past the means that the neocons use, and you continue to ignore the central aspects of neocon ideology.
There is a huge difference between the neocons and nationalists. Almost all theories of nationalism from Gelner to Kedouri to Anderson to any number of others, base the idea of nationalism on the idea of the nationalist thinking they are inherently unique and different. the neocons do not care about national boundaries or the difference between nations or national identity. They are concerned with universal norms that are completely independent on nation or ethnicity. THey argue that the US is superior not because some sort of racial or ethnic makeup but because of its ethical actions. Other nation states could presumable rise to the same level of excellence. That is not possible for nationalist.
Again I do not agree with the neocons but this is their argument. It is a lot more sophisticated than simple nationalism but again reducing as you do makes it easy to argue against neocon ideology. But again this is lazy and avoids the arguments that the neocons themselves make. DOnt worry though, today anything passes when it comes to necons ...you can say anything about the neocons as long as it is bad it will pass as deep intellectual insight. No need to think any further. On another of todays articles Ali Etraz claims that Bush was a neocon before 9-11. That is the type of simplistic misuderstanding that is tossed around when it comes to the neocons. Bush certainly was not a neocon when he came to office. But we all know that bush was bad so of course he was neocon But that is not it. Etraz continues, "If anything, neoconservatism is the 21stcentury version of 19th century nativism, the 1920s Red Scare and 1950s McCarthyism" Why cant we get beyond this simplistic nonsense here and return to the type of discussions that used to be found on Jewcy, arguments that deal seriously with politics and ideology.
Neocons are not simply nationalist. They are not McCarthyism, or 19th century nativism. They cannot be simply reduced to torture and war crimes. They have an ideology (imagine that) and that ideology should be addressed with more than just platitudes. I will say it again... Jewcy used to do that. There used to be articles that dealt with things like neoconservatism as more than just 19th century, McCarthyist, Nationalism with a bit of torture and war crimes thrown in for good measure.
Daniel Koffler
I never denied that neo-cons support torture. I said that it was not central to their ideology and that you are lazily ignoring the central aspects of neocon ideology and instead focusing on minor aspects that you find more convenient.
Now now, pleasesavejewcy, you're just repeating yourself. Saying "I support promoting democracy" does not constitute the center of any ideology, it merely raises questions. I'm not going to argue on Ali Eteraz's behalf because he can do so himself; you'll notice, however, that I'm not Ali Eteraz.
Note; I've now given you two books in addition to numerous articles and a white paper thrown in for good measure to demonstrate neoconservatism's nationalism. Your entire response, and I quote, is "Neocons are not simply nationalist." I find that rather non-responsive.
R Hampton
Neocons, at least from my limited perspective, have a queer softspot for Saudi Arabia, would you agree? Given their rhertorical stance on Iran, Hezbollah & Hamas, it takes extraordinary gall for self-proclaimed nationalists and defense hawks to ideologically extricate the Saudis from a consistent foreign policy.
To what extent is this a deliberate strategy to buy Saudi Arabia's relative lack of political agression towards Israel? To what extent is this an artifact of strong political support of the oil industry and a reflexive opposition to energy alternatives?
Leon A Weinstein
[Please don't cut and paste anti-Obama smear emails. Thx -- ed.]
please save jewcy
There you go again, defining an ideology for someone in a way that they would never define it and in a way that they never meant it. The Pearl Frum argument is not nationalist, it is neoconservative. I went through the differences above and I am not going to repeat them again. But maybe they just (to use your terminology) filtered out all the ideas that they don't want us to see. That by the way is one of the most ridicules things you wrote today. That we can't trust the ideas that they put forth because they somehow filter them. I guess we are sup[posed to read their minds. Or I guess we have you for that.
Promoting democracy is not the end all and be all of neoconservatism but it is the single most important idea that the neocons have. It takes up more space in their work than anything other idea. Yet you somehow fail to mention it... dont you find that a bit strange? I know I am repeating my self, but that is because you have failed to address why you ignore the most important aspect of neocon thought.
As for the Ali Eteraz I dont expect you to answer for him. But the name is "please save jewcy"... it has nothing to do with you personally. In fact I would welcome your opinion if it was accompanied by some of the serious thought that used to exist on this site. Instead we have your lazy platitudes (neocons = nationalism, torture, and war crimes) countered only by more lazy platitudes (neocons = MCCartyist 19th cent nativism) and no one addresses the main points of the neocon argument.
Daniel Koffler
Okay, now I see the thrust of the argument. In addition to the contents of any argument anyone makes, we must defer to their self-descriptions in making it. Hence, appending, "this is not nationalism" to any argument suffices to establish that it is not nationalist. Except I'm really not at all sure that neoconservatives do that. Does Gelernter? Do his books and articles also not count by virtue of hand waving?
The Pearl Frum argument is not nationalist, it is neoconservative.
See, this is technically called "begging the question." It assumes that neoconservatism and nationalism are incompatible as a premise in order to generate that as a conclusion. I apologize for missing your claim that only racial or ethnic supremacist ideologies can be nationalist, that's my fault. Your claim that only racial or ethnic supremacist ideologies can be nationalist is your fault. (Also makes nonsense of your earlier attribution of nationalism to the realists.)
You'll notice that I did in fact address your argument that democracy promotion is the most important feature of neoconservatism, which I now present in its syllogistic form: democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy.
I wrote:
'spread of democracy' is abstract to the point of meaninglessness. Opposition to 'democracy' construed maximally broadly is virtually non-existent in the west; conversely, support for the idea that the entire world would be better off if it were democratic is virtually unanimous. The question is, what means of working towards democratization are a) permissible, b) productive, and c) at minimum, don't fatally undermine democracy promotion from the outset (e.g., by establishing a regime of torture and secret prisons).
That seemed fairly comprehensive to me at the time, but you went and did some extra leg work:
Torture and war crimes are...a means to...the spread of a democratic order
I believe that neatly settles any outstanding issues. I'd appreciate it if you could answer the following question if you decide to persist further: why does neoconservatism justify torture, war crimes, etc., when no liberal ideology does?
R.C.
There are too many signs here already of a temptation to get lost on questions of torture.
These are not pertinent to the question of neoconservatism. They deal with another topic entirely, or two topics:
1. How best to improve war-fighting intelligence techniques to the point that intelligence failures such as those prior to 9/11 or to the resumption of hostilities in the Gulf do not happen in the future;
2. How best to enforce the "laws of war" on non-state actors and users of "unlawful" warfare, while keeping the protections for even the most unlawful captured combatants sufficiently high to maintain our self-image of being "the good guys."
These topics are of concern to everyone, not only neoconservatives, and are unrelated to the things which make neoconservatives neoconservative.
So don't get distracted, no matter how emotional those topics are.
Examining (actually, debunking) Koffler's tendentious four points about neoconservatism is going to be far more fruitful:
Point One: "[Neocons don't believe that...] war is only justified under atypical and extreme circumstances when all other options are demonstrably non-viable;"
False. Neocons believe that we are actually in atypical and extreme circumstances and that such options as unconditional negotiation with Holocaust-denying state-sponsors of terror is demonstrably counter-productive.
Point Two: "[Neocons don't believe that...] diplomacy is the first tool of foreign policy with adversarial states and is a deliberative process with no predetermined outcome;"
True or False, depending on what you mean by "predetermined outcome." If you mean Neocons are unwilling, in negotiations, to sacrifice what they view as non-negotiable security issues, then you're of course correct. And if you think they're unwilling to enter negotiations without a ballpark plan in mind for what they want to get out of it, then you're correct as well. If you're saying they go into negotiations unwilling to cede anything, then of course history contradicts you.
Point Three: "[Neocons don't believe that...] rules of ethical conduct are universal and exceptions to them only arise in exceptional circumstances, not out of some individual or country's pretensions to an exceptional identity;"
This is of course an entirely false libel of the ethics of neoconservatives, comparable to claiming that "Jews are all greedy tightwads," and offered without support. Granted that in many people's mouths, "neocon" is merely a codeword for "Jew," I still don't see why, here especially, the neocons should be subject to Goebbels-style vituperation!
Point Four: "[Neocons don't believe that...] resources are scarce (not uniquely liberal but still an important proposition that neoconservatism, as practiced by neoconservatives, effectively denies)."
I'd like to see you demonstrate from neocons' own words that their use of resources on their particular chosen foreign policy objectives indicates that they don't believe in resource scarcity. Is it not at least somewhat plausible that they merely believe their objectives so important as to have a uniquely high-priority claim on admittedly scarce resources?
After all, they think their foreign policy is ultimately a matter of national survival. They may be right or wrong about this, of course; but it is what they believe. And it's amazing the way you're willing to divert resources to that which you think you need to stay alive.
Daniel Koffler
There are too many signs here already of a temptation to get lost on questions of torture.
These are not pertinent to the question of neoconservatism.
The question-begging and hand-waving continues apace.
Now, as for this proposed debunking, let's say I admittedly don't spin neoconservative positions in the way neoconservatives themselves would, nor am I under any obligation to do so. Hence:
Point One: "[Neocons don't believe that...] war is only justified under atypical and extreme circumstances when all other options are demonstrably non-viable;"
False. Neocons believe that we are actually in atypical and extreme circumstances and that such options as unconditional negotiation with Holocaust-denying state-sponsors of terror is demonstrably counter-productive.
All circumstances are atypical in the sense that they have features other circumstances do not (otherwise they'd be one and the same); however, the suggestion that these are "extreme" circumstances is paranoid nonsense. The fact that an official within a government who has no power in the sphere of foreign affairs at all and has indeed just been gelded by the actual rulers of the country does not entail that the regime itself is "Holocaust-denying"; even if it were, that is completely immaterial to the outcome of negotiations (and self-evidently included here for sensation, indeed "emotional" effect) -- unless the subject of the negotiation were the historical fact of the Holocaust. Moreover, for as long as there has been a neoconservative foreign policy agenda, which precedes the "War on Terror" by decades, neoconservatives have advocated war as a first option and have denied the legitimacy of international liberal norms governing the conduct of war. The notion that neoconservative doctrine on the justification of the initiation of the use of force is a response to Islamic terrorism is belied by passing consideration of neoconservative literature.
Point Two: "[Neocons don't believe that...] diplomacy is the first tool of foreign policy with adversarial states and is a deliberative process with no predetermined outcome;"
True or False, depending on what you mean by "predetermined outcome." If you mean Neocons are unwilling, in negotiations, to sacrifice what they view as non-negotiable security issues, then you're of course correct. And if you think they're unwilling to enter negotiations without a ballpark plan in mind for what they want to get out of it, then you're correct as well. If you're saying they go into negotiations unwilling to cede anything, then of course history contradicts you.
I love the idea the RC uses the term "tendentious." Okay, anyway, I mean that neoconservatives are intractably opposed to good faith negotiations with negotiating partners who will not simply accede to all demands and will make no concessions more significant than simply symbolic ones. History of course does not contradict me. What on earth could you even be talking about? Reagan's negotiations with the Soviets, for which he was denounced as a modern-day Chamberlain by neoconservatives?
Point Three: "[Neocons don't believe that...] rules of ethical conduct are universal and exceptions to them only arise in exceptional circumstances, not out of some individual or country's pretensions to an exceptional identity;"
This is of course an entirely false libel of the ethics of neoconservatives, comparable to claiming that "Jews are all greedy tightwads," and offered without support. Granted that in many people's mouths, "neocon" is merely a codeword for "Jew," I still don't see why, here especially, the neocons should be subject to Goebbels-style vituperation!
Classy! Neoconservative literature is of course rife with arguments for lifting constraints on conduct on the basis of American exceptionalism; more recently, it has become rife with arguments defending and justifying torture, war crimes, kidnapping, the dismantling of the international regime prohibiting torture, war crimes, kidnapping etc. on that same basis. QED. The most generous interpretation of these comments is that RC doesn't know the meanings of the terms 'universal', 'ethics', 'exception', 'Jew', 'neocon', or the name 'Goebbels.' I think he does though. Hence the preambulatory hand-waving on the signficance of torture, and reframing into this construction:
How best to enforce the "laws of war" on non-state actors and users of "unlawful" warfare, while keeping the protections for even the most unlawful captured combatants sufficiently high to maintain our self-image of being "the good guys."
These are simply empirical questions which are in fact settled, against the neoconservative position. Yet the neoconservatives persist in arguing for torture, kidnapping, assorted other war crimes, and the dismantling of the international regime prohibiting all the foregoing.
Point Four: "[Neocons don't believe that...] resources are scarce (not uniquely liberal but still an important proposition that neoconservatism, as practiced by neoconservatives, effectively denies)."
I'd like to see you demonstrate from neocons' own words that their use of resources on their particular chosen foreign policy objectives indicates that they don't believe in resource scarcity. Is it not at least somewhat plausible that they merely believe their objectives so important as to have a uniquely high-priority claim on admittedly scarce resources?
It would be somewhat plausible if there were evidence of neoconservatives acknowledging that their policy preferences involve opportunity costs and trade-offs, but there is not. I will grok the suggestion that some of them are lying and understand the truth in private; others among them clearly do not, and offer policy proposals (demands really) that are insensible except on the assumption that there is no such thing as resource scarcity.
Cambridgeport
Let us admit it: the Neocon movement is a reaction formation to the Holocaust. Its adherents, understandably traumatized by the experience of the Jews of Europe, see the entire world through the prism of Nazi atrocities. Paradoxically, such an attitude trivializes the Holocaust by making it appear to be the norm of international politics.
The best Neocon thinkers --Saul Bellow, Ruth Wisse, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Norman Podhoretz--will admit as much if asked. The worst Necon thinkers--moron Doug Feith, lesser Himmelfarb Bill Kristol, tragic Krauthammer--are so immersed in their own righteousness that cannot see where their anger at the world comes from.
Daniel Koffler
Paradoxically, such an attitude trivializes the Holocaust by making it appear to be the norm of international politics.
Quite right, hence we get RC's non-sequitur insertion of "Holocaust-denying" to support the absurd idea that we live in atypical, extreme circumstances. Anyway, no more unpaid writing on this from me.
Stil
Thanks for an interesting debate, which was very informative.
I largely agree that leaving out the concept of "aggressive democracy promotion" from neoconservative ideology is a serious mistake.
I also agree that it is a mistake to designate Neoconservatism as a nationalist ideology, even though I can understand how one comes to such a position.
Still, Neoconservatives do tend to define American Exceptionalism in decidedly liberal terms. America is not great because of blut/boden, etc., but because it is so Liberal. (Freedom, democracy, liberty, freedom, etc. Did I mention Freedom?) This was good enough to get control of US nationalism following 9/11, which sort of mixed things up. Still, Neocon intellectuals remained committed to the Universal Nation. The US had more moral authority than, say, the UN to act, because it was more Liberal than the UN. (As the UN admits non-democracies, etc.)
Finally, as to torture, Neocons have no ideological preference for torture, as far as I can tell. There was no pre-9-11 pro-torture movement going among neocons.
Torture became a topic of discussion after 9-11, as the debate got going on how to stop future terrorist attacks on Liberal America (her goodness determined, of course, by her Liberalism). When the dirty business of creating model democracies out of hostile tribal societies got started, torture came even more into focus, as the local populations turned out not to have been quite the Liberal Democratic paragons held down by cruel illiberal rulers that the Neocons had fantasized about...
Finally, it is a mistake to decouple Liberal military adventurism under Bill Clinton from Liberal military adventurism under George W Bush. Liberal interventionism had gained a lot of cred after Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which in the end provided a lot of the cross-over support for the Iraq war. It also helped refocus Neoconservatism from domestic reform to international adventurism. Saving democracy and stopping genocide is much flashier than reforming schools, etc.
JAF
I can't wade through most of that overly written and tendentious screed. But what happens if McCain beats the Empty Messiah and has up to 40% Jewish support in doing it?! What does that do to your arguments? Because with Stephen Muss and other millionaire democratic Jews moving over to support McCain- the chances are pretty good that more and more Jews will be voting GOP in November.
Cambridgeport
Flying pigs will be kosher before the GOP gets 40% of the Jewish vote. One rich Muss does not a trend make....
I promise to eat my Red Sox baseball cap in the middle of Harvard Sq. at noon Novermber 5, 2008, if the GOP gets over 40% of te Jewish vote in 50 states. I will also eat same hat, same place, same time, if Obama gets 40% of the Mormon vote.
For years the neocons have told us that Jews would switch parties. So far they haven't managed to crack 25% on a good day. Neocons are well connected and rich, so they get a lot of print, but they are a complete aberration in terms of Jewsh values. The Iraq fiasco might bury them completely.
please save jewcy
'spread of democracy' is abstract to the point of meaninglessness. Opposition to 'democracy' construed maximally broadly is virtually non-existent in the west; conversely, support for the idea that the entire world would be better off if it were democratic is virtually unanimous. The question is, what means of working towards democratization are a) permissible, b) productive, and c) at minimum, don't fatally undermine democracy promotion from the outset (e.g., by establishing a regime of torture and secret prisons).
hmmm... maybe you have never heard of Realism... the statement that support for the idea that the entire world would be better off if it were democratic is virtually unanimous. shows an utter lack of knowlege of IR theory. Republican foreign policy has been guided by realism for a half century. Realism argues that the spreading of democracy is unimportant and often harmful. Sorry I didn't mention that before... I thought you would be familiar with what has probably been the single most influential IR theory of the second half of the 20th cent. the debate between liberals who support the proliferation of democracy and realist who do not has been the single most important IR issue for a long time now. The neocons support the proliferation of democracy.
Daniel Koffler
If a realist were asked, in the abstract, would the world be better off ceteris paribus if democracy reigned everywhere, he or she would say yes, but deny the question was meaningful because there are no such ceteris paribus conditions, and go on to insist that universal democracy is a utopian projection, not a concrete goal of foreign policy which must bend to considerations of national interest. Being for universal democracy does not distinguish one's substantive views anymore than being for universal literacy. Now, pounding the table and yelling about democracy again and again distinguishes one's temperament, but still doesn't distinguish one's views. (By the way, have you actually read the neoconservatives' books? They are not for spreading democracy as an end in itself, they are for spreading democracy as a means of advancing American national interests.) Here, and I quote, is the content you provide to neoconservatism's support for democracy promotion in its entirety:
Torture and war crimes are...a means to...the spread of a democratic order
Looks like we agree.
please save jewcy
there you go again... changing the argument and then arguing from your newly created point. The idea that we have been discussing is whether the promotion and proliferation of democracy as a foreign policy is something the US should pursue. Neocons say yes... realist no. It is not about the end goal but about policy. literacy is almost never discussed in this way.
Daniel Koffler
One more time: "promotion and proliferation of democracy" is not a foreign policy. Various approaches towards the promotion and proliferation of democracy can be any number of highly divergent approaches to foreign policy. Of course it's about the policy. Liberal internationalist and necononservative nationalist foreign policies are wildly divergent; you claimed (see your first comment) that neoconservatives are really liberal internationalists because they support an "internationalist liberal world order." Now, with that blown to pieces, you claim that the details of policy are what separate foreign policy groups, not end desires. I agree. So maybe that calls for looking at what neoconservatives and liberal policies, respectively, consist in. Jesus H. Christ.
Here's yet more reading material (on the lighter side note the literal embrace of jingoism here; this one's almost funny about the whole thing).
I look forward to your demonstration that it has nothing to do with neoconservatism by cunning use of hand waving. (I'm sorry, Max Boot doesn't count. Am I right?)
please save jewcy
well this has gone too far.. we are just repeating ourselves now so this will be my last post...
"neoconservatives are really liberal internationalists because they support an "internationalist liberal world order." Now, with that blown to pieces, you claim that the details of policy are what separate foreign policy groups, not end desires."
exactly how is the idea that neocons support an internationalist liberal world order blown to peices? YOu have admitted yourself that they support a democratic order... saying that it is blown to pieces does not make it so... you would actually have to address thie idea of them promoting a democratic world order if you wanted to blow it too pieces, but you refuse to do that because it would take more than just yelling torture and war crimes...
but let me break this down for you one last time...there were traditionally two schools of IR theory (two important ones anyway... there were of course others such as constuctivism and dependicy but they had very little influence in the US) THe main difference between the two schools was that the liberals supported a liberal wolrd order and the proliferation of democracy. They thought that this would be good for the US and for the rest of the world. THe realists believe that the proliferation of democracy is not good for US interest and are therefore againt it. Instead they support an illiberal order held up by support for totalitarian regimes and balance of power. The realists cared only for one nation and no matter what any other nation did they would never be as important as the US. If other democracies were overthrown they didn't care. Human rights violation... didn't bother them one bit. The liberals thought that support for democracy would lead to a liberal international world order and that would be good for america and everyone else. SO they did care about democracy human rights etc. THis was the debate. It wasn't over literacy or some abstract world where we can imagine everyone as democrats. This was and in many ways still is THE debate. The neocons entered this debate...not a debate about literacy or some abstract philisofical experiment about an imagined world. you may not like it, but we cannot change the past...this was the debate. THeir posistion was that the liberals were correct. An international liberal order based on democracy and human rights is good for america and eveyone else. THerefore, just like the liberals, they thought the US should try to bring about that order. THey disagreed with the realists' nationalist policies which only cared for US interests (yes... that is nationalism... they care only for their own nation). THis was the debate. I am sorry if you dont like that... if you wish it were different but it isnt. that is how it happen. the neocons main break from the liberals was that they were not confident eneogh in their own liberalism to implement a liberal world order and that was the reason the USSR held on so long and for things like rwanda and darfor. THey felt that the US needed to be more agressive in implementing a liberal democratic world order. Some of them have gone even farther and supported torture as a means to justify that end. I, as a liberal, disagree with the idea that the US needs to be more agressive and i certainly do not approve of torture. I think those things are counter productive. But if I am honest with myself I have to admit that the neocons have the same goals I have. A liberal democratic world order. On the other hand I do not agree with the realists' nationalist goals which only promote the interest of one country....their own.
If you do not want to accept that this was the debate, you can either go take an intro to IR theory at your nearest university or continue to burry your head in the sand popping up once in a while to scream about the evil neocons or what ever else happens to be en vogue. I just wish Jewcy would return to having serious debates on important issues like this.
Daniel Koffler
Well thank God. Anyway:
"neoconservatives are really liberal internationalists because they support an "internationalist liberal world order." Now, with that blown to pieces, you claim that the details of policy are what separate foreign policy groups, not end desires."
exactly how is the idea that neocons support an internationalist liberal world order blown to peices?
It's blown to bits in virtue of your concession that democracy-promotion for neoconservatism is simply a means to the end of advancing the national interest, defined by neoconservatives as worldwide hegemonic power, which is paradigmatic nationalism.
Now it's astonishing to me that you can write so many words without grokking what they mean.
Human rights violation... didn't bother [the realists] one bit.
Torture and war crimes are [for neocons]...a means to...the spread of a democratic order
All true.