On The Pompous, Malicious Intellectual Vacuity Of Leon Wieseltier

well done. 

I read Andrew Sullivan's post before this asshole published his response - and I admit did a double-take at his wording, but then I thought for all of two seconds, got the point, and that was that.   

Jews who cry anti-semite to score political points are a disgrace and a danger to the whole community. 

and by "this asshole" I meant Leon Wieseltier

And yet, none of this player hating on Leon Wieseltier can explain Andrew Sullivan's bizarre comments in the first place.

Sullivan's comment makes no sense in any context, whether interpreted as being anti-semitic or not. How does he think that Bill Kristol is a "manipulator of Christians."

As for Wieseltier's giving up on academic philosophy, it's clear from his statement that the reason wasn't that "real philosophy is too hard", but that English and American philosophy departments by that time had given-up the task of "real philosophy" (i.e. studying the fundamental metaphysical, ontological, and epistomological problems, the great question of Man and Being, that have perplexed mankind for millennia) in favor of wallowing in the language games of analytical philosophy, largely under the baleful influence of Wittgenstein's claim that there are no genuine philosophical "problems", only "puzzles" to be solve by mathematical and linguisitc analysis. It was not "real philosophy" that Wieseltier fled, but the replacement of "real philosophy" by arid Wittgensteinian language games.

You know what I love? Watching people who don't know anything about analytic philosophy trying, and invariably failing, to attack it. Case in point, anonymous at 12:09. I count 14 (plus one, see below) false claims and implications in his comment. And it's late, so there might be more I didn't spot.

1) There is a huge difference between Wittgenstein's early and late philosophical work. Anonymous gives no indication that he has any clue.

2) Anonymous's characterization of Wittgenstein pertains only to later Wittgenstein.

3) It is an embarrassing simplification of later Wittgenstein in any case.

4) To the extent that Wittgenstein ever exerted a significant influence over the direction of analytic philosophy, it was the Tractatus, not the Philosophical Investigations that exerted that influence.

5) But not even TLP was all that influential in the development of analytic philosophy. For the most part Wittgenstein was and is regarded as a brilliant anomaly whose work has not guided other philosophers' research. (The one notable exception is itself a very odd case.)

6) Anonymous's attribution of the turn towards language and logic to Wittgenstein is off by decades. Analytic philosophy begins with Frege's Begriffschrift in 1879. TLP was published in 1921. Philosophical Investigations, the work anonymous caricatures, was not published until 1953, by which point Quine was solidifying his pre-eminence in the field and the rehabilitation of metaphysics (see #12) was already underway.

7) Relatedly, the foundational figures of analytic philosophy are Frege, Moore, and Russell, not Wittgenstein.

8) Relatedly, apart from Wittgenstein specialists, of whom there are not all that many, very few philosophers today are engaged in anything that could reasonably be called a Wittgensteinian project.

9) "the fundamental metaphysical, ontological, and epistomological [sic] problems" Uh, wow. Ontology is a subfield within metaphysics, numbnuts. One reason the early analytic philosophers were contemptuous of metaphysics is that the metaphysicians of the day would casually indulge in category errors like anonymous's, or, also like anonymous, use philosophical sounding words they didn't understand. More embarrassing still were the outright logical trainwrecks, like what Carnap demonstrated when he painstakingly went through a paper of Heidegger's and showed that it was strictly and literally meaningless.

10) However, the early analytic philosophers were very much engaged in epistemological projects, and indeed, epistemology has always been and continues to be at the core of analytic philosophy.

11) Although people who use phrases like "the great question of Man and Being, that [has] perplexed mankind for millennia" should not be allowed anywhere near a philosophy room, the notion that analytic philosophy is not engaged with traditional philosophical questions is criminally idiotic. A.N. Whitehead, who co-authored the Principia with Russell, famously described all of philosophy as "footnotes to Plato." Much of the subject matter of contemporary analytic philosophy has its origins in Greek philosophy.

12) Moreover, the salutary work the first and second generations of analytic philosophers did shaming people who engaged in stupid, confused, absurd, contradictory, and meaningless metaphysics out of the discipline, not to mention markedly raising the standards for who gets to say things like "the great question of Man and Being," laid the foundation for the rehabilitation of metaphysics over the last 50 years to the point where it is once again the pre-eminent area of philosophy. Strings of words --- they aren't sentences --- that are literally meaningless won't serve as useful answers to even modest questions of Man and Being; contemporary metaphysics, being meaningful, offers the best shot at coming up with a good answer.

13) Given that, in general, every traditional problem of philosophy is explored in the analytic tradition --- but the standards of argumentation are very high and people accustomed to impressing rubes with pseudo-sophisticated endless prattling about nothing couldn't make the grade --- the only reason a possible reason and the likely one for someone in Wieseltier's circumstances who claims to be a philosophy student to refuse to learn analytic philosophy is that he or she can't cut it.

14) Given that, in particular, Oxford in the 70s was one of the best places to do philosophy in the world, and any area of philosophy he might have wanted to study would have had incredible resources invested in it there, the only reason for Wieseltier to avoid doing any actual philosophy and instead spend his time kissing Isaiah Berlin's ass is that he just couldn't handle it.

And one more error, unrelated to the rest:

How does he think that Bill Kristol is a "manipulator of Christians."

Kristol participates in political operations involving things like codifying discrimination against disfavored groups, designed to wring votes out of sincere Christians (whose beliefs he finds absurd) in order to bolster his foreign policy agenda. Clear enough?

So, by my count 15 separate piles of bullshit in a few short sentences. That's an impressive load!

"...a brilliant anomaly whose work has not guided other philosopher's research. (The one notable exception is itself a very odd case.)"

I think you're referring to the Tractatus as the "notable exception". Or do you refer to another philosopher whose work has been guided by W? If so, who?

Seems to me that both the Tractatus and the Investigations stimulated lots of work by significant philosophers; logical positivists in the case of the former, Anscombe, Malcolm, Macintyre et al in the case of the latter. 

 Excellent exposure of the insufferable ninny Wieseltier, though. 

Ismail, I was referring to Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, or Kripkenstein as it's colloquially (and somewhat more accurately) known --- by the time it was written, Kripke had basically gone off the deep end himself. I don't deny for a moment that Wittgenstein has stimulated a fair amount of fruitful philosophical work (TLP much more than PI), but if you were to examine the development of analytic philosophy over the 20th century to the present, Wittgensteinian thought, either Tractarian or Investigative, would look like a narrow branch off the main road. There's plenty that's interesting there, but it's far from the mainstream; to suggest, as anonymous did, that most analytic philosophy is done under Wittgenstein's influence (baleful or not), is simply to confess not having a clue about the history and content of analytic philosophy. You'd agree with that, right? By the way, none of this is meant to endorse anonymous@12:09's philistine Wittgenstein bashing in any way. I'm no Wittgenstein expert myself, but when I find time, reading more of and about Ludwig will be a high priority.

(And indeed, bringing up the Tractarian influence on the positivists underscores my point; positivism is a dead project. I happen to think a qualified rehabilitation of Carnap and some of the others (not Ayer) would be worthwhile, since there's a lot to them that's separable from verificationism and related excesses, but the reputation of positivism is so poor that my position of mild sympathy for some of the people associated with it is a distinctly minority position.)

Glad we see eye to eye on Wieseltier; his prominence in intellectual circles is a symptom of profound cultural rot in this country.

"Kristol participates in political operations involving things like codifying discrimination against disfavored groups, designed to wring votes out of sincere Christians (whose beliefs he finds absurd) in order to bolster his foreign policy agenda. Clear enough?"

Examples please of Kristol working to support "political operations" aimed at "codifying discrimination"? If you're going to allege that soemone suports "codifying discrimination" you damn well better explain what you're referring to. 

Also, any evidence for the claim that "he finds absurd" the beliefs of sincere Christians? (Strictly speaking, as a Jew perhaps he does find core beliefs of Christianity "absurd", but that's not the sense in which this anti-Kristol meme is using the word). Sullivan and you seem to be implying that Kristol deems Christian people themselves as rubes, simpletons, brainwashed idiots to be manipulated by all-knowing Jewish political masters like himself. Having heard and read Kristol for some time now, I see no evidence of such hatred or condescension toward sincere Christians. 

Are you unfamiliar with Kristol's career? When he left academia, he became a high-ranking professional Republican political operative guiding many of the successor strategies to the Southern strategy. He was hired by the Times because he's never stopped being a political operative, and Sulzberger thought that would make for good copy. Unlike some of his co-partisans, he's not stupid enough to sincerely redbait Senator Obama. With that in mind, you can start reading here, and Google and Wikipedia are also your friends; I, unfortunately, don't have time to write a long exposition of Kristol.

Ah, so apparently you and Sullivan are of the opinion that "high-ranking professional Republican political operative" is synonymous with "manipulator of Christians" (those easily led rubes!) and with being in favor of "codifying discrimination" (ex. opposing things like re-defining the term "marriage" to included homosexual couples is considered "discimination"). Got it. I see how you think now. Such impeccable logic. Really putting that B.A. in undergrad philosophy to good use!  

I don't have the time or inclination to explain why codifying discimination against gay men and women is codifying discrimination to people who can't infer one from the other without extra help, but here is where, perhaps not my philosophy degree, but simple practical reasoning skills come in handy.

Sullivan's original claim: Kristol is a manipulator of Christians.

Wieseltier's claim: That's Jew baiting.

My claim: No, it obviously isn't.

Your claim: Sullivan's original claim is wrong. About which you are wrong, but if you were right, has no bearing on Wieseltier's willful and pernicious mischaracterization of Sullivan's claim. 

To reiterate: I don't have the time to correct everyone on the internet who embraces an odious agenda of discrimination against gay people and uses euphemisms to do it. None of which is germane to the matter at hand, and if that's the direction you want to take this thread, you can do it on your own. 

Really all I want to do is clarify what I think Anon was getting at regarding Wittgenstein.  I don't think he meant literally that most analytic philosophy was done under Wittgenstein's influence--rather I interpret it to mean that if you compare that type of analysis to the works of (bias coming) Marcuse, Piccone, Habermas, Fromm, Horkheirmer, Kierkegaard, Neitzche, and all other non-positivists--then it is lacking in content. 

Regarding Kristol and Wieseltier, I have no comment. 

Naftali has nailed it exactly. Thinkers such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Cioran, Heidegger, Berdyaev, Bloch, and others - even Habermas, whom I generally dislike - have plumbed depths of being and experience that the dry-as-dust, contentless stuff of analytic philosphy can't even begin to comprehend.

As for "codifying discrimination": Again, you have failed to provide any justification for deeming the example used  - that of so-called homosexual "marriage"  - to be mere "discrimination". Is it mere "discrimination" to uphold the normative moral values that have held true in every society for thousands of years? Even if so, how does this make Kristol particularly odious or turn him into a "manipulator of Christians" (and does not that phrase of Sullivan have at least a whiff of anti-semitism about it?) Is it mere "discrimination" to refuse to capitulate to the debasement of language by the very use of the word "marriage"  to describe homosexual relationships? The word marriage needs no qualifier as either heterosexual or homosexual. The word in itself means a relationship between a man and a woman (variously sanctioned legally and religiously); it always has for thousands of years in every culture on earth, not just among Christians. Thus, to speak of "homosexual marriage" is an absurdity, while to speak of "heterosexual marriage" is redundant. It is not mere "discrimination" which seeks to uphold traditional moral, legal, and religious values, and which refuses to capitulate in re-defining words and institutions to conform to the latest intellectual and moral fads. 

I suspected, but until now wasn't confident enough to state outright, that today's anonymous is the same as the anonymous of last night's 14 different misconceptions about analytic philosophy (more than that actually, but I got tired). Jesus, what does it take to trigger embarrassment these days?

Thinkers such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Cioran, Heidegger, Berdyaev, Bloch, and others - even Habermas, whom I generally dislike - have plumbed depths of being and experience that the dry-as-dust, contentless stuff of analytic philosphy can't even begin to comprehend.

No, that's simply false, and goes to show nothing other than that the author of these words has no idea what the content of analytic philosophy is. The thinkers you cite, moreover, are incommensurate in numerous ways. They are also highly variable in quality. For example, Heidegger's corpus is rife with a priori errors, errors he might have avoided if he knew any logic or math.

To the main point, there is no philosophical question you might want to ask that the analytic tradition excludes. Nor does it exclude any significant or worthwhile figure in the history of philosophy --- and indeed, one of the potential joys of doing analytic philosophy is the experience not only of rediscovering past greats whose stock has fallen, but also of establishing their direct relevance to contemporary concerns. Nor, having won all the intellectual battles it was engaged in, is analytic philosophy ungenerous toward the vanquished. If a figure from 19th and 20th century Continental philosophy has a valuable insight on something, that's welcomed too. What analytic philosophy does exclude, like no approach to philosophy before it, is nonsensical answers to philosophical questions. Rightly so.

On the points about marriage and civil equality for gay people --- one extraordinarily useful skill that practice in analytic philosophy builds is the ability to anticipate the course along which a dialectic will develop. It's mildly amusing, therefore, to see the same standard argumentative moves deployed as if they represented anything that hasn't already been aired out, refuted, and sent packing. At some point I'll have the time to write a piece about gay marriage and the arguments surrounding it, but until then I'll leave it at the observation that every single sentence in that paragraph contains a mistake of fact or logic (frequently both).

I might be wrong, but I think Anon was putting his discussion into a longer and very cool debate between the schools some classify as Positivist and the (broad brush here) Dialectical schools.  For instance, there was a book, probably out print, that published the debates between Adorno and Popper.  But that was one instance in a longer discussion that went back to a Kantian approach--how far back?--elaborated by Kant, and a Hegelian approach elaborated by, of course, Hegel.  Long, old debate.

The position of the Dialecticians was that the positivists answered the questions, but they answered them very badly.

Do you remember that scene at the end of Support Your Local Sheriff, during the big gunfight where James Garner holds up his hand, the shooting stops and he walks across the street and lets the shooting continue?  That's me today. 

At least Naftali demonstrates that someone around here has some ability to think clearly.

And still no refutation of the notion that opposing gay so-called "marriage" is a demonstration of Kristol and his Christian minions "codyfying discrimination". You claim there are errors of fact and logic in my paragraph about the issue, but you provide no examples or attempt to refute anything said. Funny how a little undergrad philosphy makes some people think their political arguments are beyond questioning: "I favor gay 'marriage' therefore you are illogical and wrong on the facts to hold otherwise". Unfortunately you have no facts or logical basis for claiming that "marriage" should be exapanded to include homosexuals - just a personal policy preference. If you favor it as a matter of political policy, fine, but don't try to claim that logic makes your policy position  irrefutable.

Naftali, there are some terminlogical issues that are making it difficult for me to understand your point.

The logical positivists were a group of thinkers who dominated the Anglo-American scene between the world wars, but have since fallen into extreme disfavor --- as I said in an earlier comment, their reputation is worse than it deserves to be. The entirety of the analytic tradition, including the positivists, pays heed to dialectic. One of the typical first steps to doing any analytic philosophy is tracing the dialectical history of your subject --- in a large enough space (say, a book), back to the Greeks, and in extensive detail.

Kant is perhaps the last major historical figure who is highly influential in both the analytic and Continental traditions.

It's wrong to describe the camp opposed to analytic philosophy as a "school" (which is my guess about what's going on in your comment): practically the only thing that Continental philosophers have in common, on the whole, is a rejection of the methods of conceptual analysis.

By the way, as long as we're discussing the insularity of traditions, it's true that from the time the split between analytic and Continental philosophy became recognizable, they largely ignored one another. But analytic philosophy, contrary to the reputation it acquired among people who have strong, uninformed opinions about it, incorporates the whole history of philosophy except the post-split Continental tradition. Continental philosophy, by contrast, has an enormous historical blindspot, namely most philosophy written in English since vernacular languages replaced Latin in scholarly work.

No, anonymous, the claim is not, I agree with position X, therefore opposition to X is based on errors of fact or logic. If you were to offer an argument against gay marriage not based in errors of fact or logic, I would be happy to entertain it in the appropriate forum when I have time to (therefore, not in a forum in which it is irrelevant when I don't have time). As it happens, it is in fact the case that every sentence of the paragraph above in which you argue against gay marriage contains a fatal error of fact or logic, in some cases both. What I hope we can agree on is that the prospects of a fruitful discussion about it, at least at this moment, are extremely poor.

Once more: The question is whether Sullivan's description of Kristol can plausibly be characterized as Jew baiting. My contention is that it cannot. By the lights of your own characterization of Sullivan's claim, it cannot be plausibly described as Jew baiting. Whether, in addition to not being an instance of Jew baiting, it is also mistaken for the reasons you suggest it is mistaken, neither obviates your commitment to the proposition that Sullivan's description of Kristol cannot plausibly be described as Jew baiting, nor any other way for any other reason makes Wieseltier's claim more plausible.

Now, if you wish to post comments relevant to this piece, I suggest more patently false claims about analytic philosophy.

You can probably guess who my philosophy professor was, who was actually known as a sociologist, and so yes, there would be a need for us to clarify terms, which would require a whole lot more work than either of us would care to do without beer.

Then when all of that is squared away, we'd have to compare questions addressed, quality and insight of answers. But my professor grouped Positivists who were called or called themselves Positivists, along with philosophers whom he considered to provide their theoretical roots. So, it all starts with the rivers of Kant and Hegel.

And you see how right about now it's time for beer? Come to think of it, maybe that's the ultimate purpose of philosophy, to give folks a really good reason to go get beer. Oh yeah, there's sports, but does that really compare with a discussion on the difference between a dialectical Marx and a phenomenological Marx? Don't think so.

Yet agian you have failed to point out any of the alleged  errors in fact or logic that you find in the following paragraph 9and in "every sentence" no less, you claim):

"Is it mere "discrimination" to uphold the normative moral values that have held true in every society for thousands of years? Even if so, how does this make Kristol particularly odious or turn him into a "manipulator of Christians" (and does not that phrase of Sullivan have at least a whiff of anti-semitism about it?) Is it mere "discrimination" to refuse to capitulate to the debasement of language by the very use of the word "marriage"  to describe homosexual relationships? The word marriage needs no qualifier as either heterosexual or homosexual. The word in itself means a relationship between a man and a woman (variously sanctioned legally and religiously); it always has for thousands of years in every culture on earth, not just among Christians. Thus, to speak of "homosexual marriage" is an absurdity, while to speak of "heterosexual marriage" is redundant. It is not mere "discrimination" which seeks to uphold traditional moral, legal, and religious values, and which refuses to capitulate in re-defining words and institutions to conform to the latest intellectual and moral fads. "

 The first three sentences are, in fact, questions, not statements.

Let's take the next sentence after the initial questions: "The word marriage needs no qualifier as either heterosexual or homosexual." this is true, both in fact and logic. The basic legal definition of marriage is :the legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife" (See. Black's Law Dicitonary for detailed references). The ordinaryt dictionary definition of marriage is likewise, "The mtutal relation of husband and wife...the institution whereby men and women are joined...." Thus, marriage is by its very nature "heterosexual". Use of the qualifier "heterosexual" is redundant, however, as heterosexuality is entailed by the very meaning of the term marriage. Likewise, use of the phrase "homosexual marriage" is an absurdity; the very definition of marriage rules out the prospect of it being a "homosexual" union or institution. To speak of "homosexual marriage" is as absurd as it would be to speak of a "female King"; by definition a female cannot be a "King", but would be a "Queen" (unless, you wish to re-define King to mean simply any ruling sovereign of whatever sex, in much the same way as the homosexual lobby wishes to re-define marriage as simply a voluntary contractual agreement and living arrangement between two people of any sex. Any why only two, by the way? The argument for "gay marriage" logical leads to the conclusion that polygamy must be sanctioned also.)

Next sentence: "The word in itself means a relationship between a man and a woman (variously sanctioned legally and religiously); it always has for thousands of years in every culture on earth, not just among Christians." See above for explanation of the meaning of the word marriage. Liekwise true in fact as to the later portion of the statement, In all the years I've heard people make claims on behalf of "homosexual marriage" I have yet to see anyone demonstrate any evidence that any society in history, of whatever religious background or influence, has santioned marriage between smae sex couples. The only deviation from that norm has been societies which allow one man to marry multiple women, but never does that entail a man amrrying another man or a woman a woman.

Next sentence: "Thus, to speak of "homosexual marriage" is an absurdity, while to speak of "heterosexual marriage" is redundant." See above again as pertains to the definition of marriage.

Final sentence: "It is not mere 'discrimination' which seeks to uphold traditional moral, legal, and religious values, and which refuses to capitulate in re-defining words and institutions to conform to the latest intellectual and moral fads." Well, no errors of fact or logic there either, unless you wish to claim that all traditional, normative moral values and legal institutions amount to nothing more than mere "discrimination", but, if that's the case, your problem isn't just with marriage, but with the whole of the Western legal, religious, moral, and ethical tradition (and that of much of the rest on Mankind too). 

Uh, haven't most forms of discrimination been based upon upholding traditional moral, legal and religious values?

Anonymous, I promise at some point I'll write a thing about gay marriage which will explain why every sentence of your argument against it is logically flawed, factually flawed, or both. For now, I'll just point out a) conversational pragmatics teaches us to interpret rhetorical questions (even non-loaded ones) as declarative sentences, and b) another anonymous does cut right to the heart of (one of many instances of) your question-begging.

Daniel,

I can't agree with some of what you said about analytic philosophy and W's influence on it.

For one thing, there are important philosophical issues and questions that analytic philosophers don't investigate but continental philosophers do investigate.  This is not to say, however, that analytic tools are inappropriate to those questions, although I suspect that that's true too.

W's PI was, in my opinion, quite influential in analytic philosophy of language, although the influence is indirect.  Colin McGinn's Wittgenstein book is helpful on this matter.  The emphasis on context is enormous now, and nearly everyone is vigilant in checking to see if they are being hoodwinked by various grammatical constructions and patterns.  As I understand it, these developments owe much to the PI.

I say these things as a Fordham professor specializing in core analytic philosophy!

Bryan,

I have to weigh in on Daniel's side on the influence of Wittgenstein. Except for debates about rule-following, which occupy a rather small corner of the philosophy of language, PI has had a much smaller impact on analytic philosophy than non-philosophers think. For example, I'm a contemporary analytic philosopher at a pretty good department, and almost none of the work of my colleagues has been influenced by PI (perhaps none). And a lot of the influence of PI has, as Daniel rightly pointed out, been due to Kripke's book. Indeed, I think Daniel has been doing an exemplary job explaining the current state of things (including contemporary analytic philosophy's unjustified disdain for positivism, which is due to the current overwhelming influence of metaphysics on the contemporary scene).

On Naftali's comment about the dispute going back to a rift between Hegelians and Positivists - this is obviously extremely confused. In contemporary analytic philosophy, there are (unfortunately) more people who are sympathetic to Hegel than to Carnap. Here is a nice review of a book on Hegelian analytic philosophers that will bring the uninitiated up on some features of the current philosophical scene:

http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12925 

"Come to think of it, maybe that's the ultimate purpose of philosophy, to give folks a really good reason to go get beer." 

As a lapsed undergraduate philosophy major who went on to graduate work in another field, I retain enough fondness and respect for the area to be somewhat miffed at your suggestion. I recall trying to explain my own work (in the analytic tradition) to relatives who imagined that philosophy had to do with a Zen-like acceptance of life's setbacks ("Well, his kid tortures dogs and his wife's the Great Whore of Mosholu Parkway, but he takes it philosophically") or with a tendency to utter pithy and avuncular bits of advice.

I'm many years away from any serious work in philosophy, but our friend Daniel is recently minted and, from the evidence of his posts and comments, quite serious about and adept in a highly rigorous and technical variety of inquiry. Why would you suggest to such a person that the best reason to exercise a practice that he's obviously spent a great deal of time and effort polishing to quite a luster is that it gives one an excuse to drink beer? 

I know you were probably going for some kind of bonhomie, but I detect the clank of a tin ear. 

"I'll write a thing about gay marriage which will explain why every sentence of your argument against it is logically flawed, factually flawed, or both." Your intellectual pretension and arrogance apparently know no bounds. Of course, you can "explain" no such thing, because it is not true. I explained in great detail the standard legal and dictionary definition of "marriage" as a part of my argument above. It is quite simply impossible for you to "explain that every sentence of [my] argument...is logically flawed, factually flawed or both". If your think this, then you have a very feeble grasp of either facts or logic. As a start you might wish to delve into the history of marriage as an institution, both in its legal and religious/cultural aspects, and understand such simply things as how marriage has alwasy been defined in both common and civil law.

Ultimately, your position on homosexual "marriage" merely comes down to assuming that your preferred political policy is superior and logically inevitable, which would only be the case if one accepts the first premises upon which your position will be based if you ever do explain it. I can confidently predict that therein will lie the flaw in your argument. You will expound some first principles of political and civil rights that you deem to be exiomatic, and essentially self-evident, and then claim your position is the only logical outcome based on those principles. As ususal in any serious moral or political argument, first principles are the key. By all means try to convince people that they should accept the principles upon which your argument is based, and that they should accept the logical outcome of those principles, but please don't persist in the borish delusion that you have basic facts and fundamental logic on your side.

Hi Jason,

Would you say that today's emphasis on contextual factors, appreciation of the diversity of linguistic role, and emphasis on the partial meaning-determining role of linguistic use is largely independent of the PI?  I thought it wasn't, although I know that I don't know the history of 20th century analytic philosophy of language as well as you do.  I was under the impression that Wittgenstein alerted the analytic community to certain issues that weren't investigated before.  As I said in my original comment, the influence has to be indirect, as almost no one in analytic philosophy of language writes books or articles that refer to the PI (I certainly never did when I was working on belief ascription).

By the way, who inspired Grice?  Was it Austin?  And if so, who inspired Austin?  Was it Wittgenstein?  In part, anyway?  I don't know.  It would be interesting to trace an intellectual history of "philosophical inspiration" for many of the big issues/ideas we see in today's analytic philosophy of language (not dissertation advisor stuff).  For instance, from what influences do we get the articles in the Steven Davis Pragmatics volume?

Best,

Bryan

I don't know this Wieseltier guy (and he does sound like a bit of a tool), but your 14 different misconceptions piece is, at best, very pedantic.  

In any case, I think maybe you're trading on an ambiguity in our understanding of "analytic philosophy."  Many contemporary philosophers, such as myself, claim to be doing "analytic" philosophy (in my case, political phil) rather than continental--though this distinction is certainly not without problems.  Still, I am in no way engaged in the logical analysis "analytic*" philosophy of Frege, Russell, Whitehead, etc.  In this way, one can reasonably say that Rawls is an analytic philosopher, though he is not an analytic* philosopher.  And I think it is reasonable to make a similar statement for M&E philosophers as I just made for Rawls--though I suppose contemporary epistemologists (did I spell that right, Dan?) or whoever would be expected to be familiar with analytic*.

So much of your very impressive knowledge of Witt. might not be of much use if this Wieseltier character (and likewise anonymous) have in mind analytic*.  There's certainly no denying that for a particular period in time analytic* dominated philosophy departments and if someone was interested in, say, normative or applied ethics, or political philosophy, not much was happening...this despite the fact that these topics are decidedly philosophical and not necessarily part of continental philosophy.

 Finally, you claim that "the only reason for someone who claims to be a philosophy student to refuse to learn analytic philosophy is that he or she can't cut it."  The _only_ reason....really?  Whether you mean analytic or analytic*,  it's just plain wrong.  Silly even.

 If you mean analytic*: S goes to Undergrad U  and studies normative ethics, picking up her history and logic requirements...never so much as hearing the name Russell., etc.  She then goes to, I don't know, almost any Grad school, and does her thesis in normative ethics, never taking any courses in analytic*.  She then goes and gets a job teaching, legitimately claiming to be a philosopher.

 If you mean analytic: S goes to Undergrad U wherein the focus is on continental figures.  S likes it and goes to a Grad school specializing in continental (say, Stony Brook, or Loyola or whatever).  She then gets a job, and legitimately claims to be a philosopher.

In either case, there is simply no reason to think they couldn't have handled being an analytic/analytic* philosopher.  Nor is there any reason to think that if they couldn't handle it, it would follow they shouldn't be doing what they're doing. 

too bad you're stuck arguing with jerks like mr. "thousands of years of
discrimination can't be wrong". he would have done a fine job defending
the dred scott decision, too.

speaking of which--i took your reference to kristol's complicity in
discrimination to be a reference to the racist wing rather than
to the homophobic wing of the republican platform in any case--as was made clear by your reference to the 'southern strategy'. as lee
atwater, the uber-operator of the republicans said himself, "we used to
say n*gger n*gger n*gger, but now you can't say that anymore. so now we
say states rights, forced busing, and cutting taxes." atwater was
rove's tutor, and kristol sucked at the same source.

kristol has plenty of blood on his hands--the blood of american blacks,
as well as the blood of iraqis. the fact that he has assisted
republican homophobia is one of his lesser sins.

Anon @ 1:56 --- I'll happily concede that #13 was poorly worded and written in a heated moment, and was really trying to make a general point about someone in Wieseltier's situation, with his background, his motivations, the philosophical options open to him, and his choices. Here's what I continue to maintain on that score: first, I'm construing "analytic" as analytic rather than analytic*; second doing analytic (and not just analytic*) requires work in logic (even if you never hear about Russell, Whitehead, et al); third, there is no excuse not to learn some analytic (rather than analytic*) philosophy in a department, like Oxford's, that has/had very strong analytic philosophy; fourth, Wieseltier has no excuse. In Wieseltier's particular case, whatever his avowed reasons for making his decisions, the evidence from his body of work is pretty clear that he couldn't have handled any rigorous philosophical work. In general, I'll tentatively say that #13 is probably true for anybody who takes the breathtakingly philistine view towards logic that Wieseltier expresses --- refusing to study it out of hand.

Let me add, in general, I think there is no excuse, besides not being in a department that teaches one of them, for not even attempting to learn something about both contemporary philosophical traditions; though my interests are heavily core analytic M&E and language, I'm glad and grateful to have done work on Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Hegel.

I agree that analytic* did predominate for a period of time to the exclusion of important philosophical fields (like yours) that are by no means the exclusive property of continental philosophy, but that hasn't been the case in decades; and furthermore, I argue, despite its excesses, analytic* had a salutary effect on philosophy in that it significantly improved the standards of philosophical argumentation. Moreover, there were defensible reasons for the analytic* philosophers to fight the intellectual battles they fought. And, one of the wonderful things about contemporary analytic philosophy --- construed broadly --- is that it incorporates the full philosophical tradition up to the split. And indeed, if you can make a good case that some element of continental philosophy deserves a hearing, nothing prevents you from doing so. My hunch is that David Lewis's broad methodological principles, and the influence they have across the field, are responsible for a lot of the increasing openness of recent years.

Anon@2:27: You're right about Kristol being in with the Atwater crowd. As far as I know, he wasn't writing Atwaterian op-eds at the time, which is why I linked to the FMA piece and suggested doing further research.

So cool that we have some heavyweights weighing in, by the way --- I'm guessing Brian Leiter must have linked.

Hey, let's go talk about it over a beer and pinball.  What did you do after class, go to the library and study?

Actually, that might explain a lot. :-) 

Sign up here and send me a private message.  I'll tell you where I got my confusion, and I'll let you debate in that arena.  But I've seen these guys debate--you'd better have your ducks lined up just right.  At the very least, we'll agree to disagree.

I probably shouldn’t bother, but I can’t resist responding to Daniel’s list of "false claims," most of which are themselves false or misleading.

Whether there is a difference between the "early" and "later" Wittgenstein, what the difference is, and how big a difference it is, are all extremely controversial questions in Wittgenstein scholarship. Influential interpreters like Cora Diamond and James Conant, for example, argue for a fairly extreme level of continuity between the TLP and the PI.

Wittgenstein’s influence on analytic philosophy is second to none. TLP influenced both Cambridge analysis (e.g., Ramsey, Braithwaite, Wisdom) and logical positivism (the most important ideas of the latter were, more or less, lifted from either the TLP or Wittgenstein’s work in the early 30s). And given that much of Quine’s philosophy was formulated as a response to logical positivism, it owes a debt to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s "later" philosophy was and continues to be very influential. It was the driving force behind Oxford "ordinary language philosophy" (e.g., Ryle and Strawson). Several of the most prominent contemporary philosophers—Putnum, McDowell, Wright (hardly Wittgenstein "specialists")—are greatly influenced by the later Wittgenstein. There are many others that could be mentioned. Put simply, Wittgenstein’s influence on analytic philosophy is ubiquitous.

N.N., there is certainly a range of plausible weights we could assign both to the continuity between early and late Wittgenstein, and to Wittgenstein's degree of influence in the analytic tradition. My understanding and experience are line with Jason Stanley's --- and his testimony strikes me as fairly significant.  

Wittgenstein’s influence on analytic philosophy is second to none.

Do you really want to rest on that? I think I'd be willing to make a modest wager that if we took a straw poll of faculty and grad students at PGR departments, that proposition would lose. Actually, I'd be very interested in who the top 5 would be. I would guess Frege, Russell, Quine, Kripke, and Lewis, in no particular order.

Here's a philosophical question: What is the maximum number of degrees of separation between two philosophers such that one can still count as an influence on the other? (It would sound odd to me, though not certainly false, to say that Plato's influence on analytic philosophy is second to none.) Obviously this gets rather more complicated once you begin assigning relative weights of influence. 

[Jason Stanley's] testimony strikes me as pretty significant.

And why is that?

Why ask about degrees of separation? Wittgenstein's influence on Cambridge analysts was direct, as was his influence on the Vienna Circle (he met regularly with Schlick, Waismann and Carnap in the late 20s and early 30s; and the two principal doctrines of logical positivism, viz., the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, and analytic truths are vacuous, were expliticly formulated by Wittgenstein and transmitted to the Vienna Circle through those meetings). Ryle was influenced by direct contact with Wittgenstein and his writings. And contemporary philosophers like Putnum and McDowell explicitly draw on Wittgenstein in their work. I didn't even mention important analytic philosophers like Anscombe, Black and Malcolm who were Wittgenstein's students. The suggestion that Wittgenstein's philosophy (in all its phases) wasn't extremely influential in analytic philosophy is patently false.

Why do I take Stanley's testimony as weighty? Well, he's one of the top people in philosophy of language, which is Wittgenstein's subject if anything is, and he's extremely well-versed in the history of the tradition, and he's at what is undeniably one of the strongest analytic philosophy programs in the world.

Here are the recent courses he lists:

Fall 2007: Philosophy 103: Introduction to Philosophy (undergraduate)
Philosophy 513: Logic and Natural Language (graduate)
Spring 2007: Philosophy 220: Theory of Knowledge (undergraduate)
Philosophy 670: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Language: Conditionals (graduate, co-taught with Barry Loewer)
Fall 2006: sabbatical leave
Spring 2006: Philosophy 421: Semantics of Natural Language (undergraduate)
Philosophy 646: Advanced Topics in Analytic Philosophy: Fregean and Russellian Theories of Meaning (graduate)
Fall 2005: Philosophy 210: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
Philosophy 420: Advanced Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)

Yet he wrote:

Except for debates about rule-following, which occupy a rather small corner of the philosophy of language, PI has had a much smaller impact on analytic philosophy than non-philosophers think...[A]lmost none of the work of my colleagues has been influenced by PI (perhaps none).

Okay, that's informative. Let's say for the sake of argument that in a survey of philosophers of language, the majority would concur with Stanley. (Again, that's something I'd be willing to place a small wager on.) Move to any field outside philosophy of language, and the majorities would only get more lopsided. If that's the case, and there's good reason to think so, I don't see any way of squaring it with a claim of extreme influence, despite there being important figures who did/do draw on Wittgensteinian thoughts. Look, you didn't even mention Kripke, who is certainly more influential than any of the other PI-influenced people you mention; and it's not as if people aren't aware of the Kripkenstein work. And still, the Stanley position is prevalent outside philosophy of language, and if Stanley's right, in philosophy of language too.

Degrees of separation are worth mentioning because positivism is dead and in extreme disrepute (undeservedly so, as I've argued). Citing Quine as an example of Wittgenstein's influence on the grounds that Quine was reacting to positivism seems question-begging to me. How much does analytic philosophy owe to F.H. Bradley? How about McTaggart, who gets an obligatory cite in a healthy proportion of papers on the metaphysics of time?

How about this case: In Vagueness, Timothy Williamson traces back his epistemicism to several ancient Stoics. Now, I'm pretty sure that there are more people doing work on epistemicism right now than on PI. If so, does that mean the Stoics are extremely influential in analytic philosophy, at least at the moment? Surely not.

Arguments from authority are generally considered fallacious. One of the problems with them is that a contrary authority can always be found. So, for example, if I wanted to rely on authority, I could mention Peter Hacker at Oxford. I could list his many publications in the philosophy of language, and his many publications on Wittgenstein (something missing from Stanley's CV), though I don't know why I'd bother to list the courses he's taught.

Except for debates about rule-following, which occupy a rather small corner of the philosophy of language, PI has had a much smaller impact on analytic philosophy than non-philosophers think.

Unless by 'philosophy of language' Stanley means 'current philosophy of language,' this statement is obviously false. So-called "ordinary language philosophy" (e.g., the philosophy of Ryle and Strawson) was a major movement within analytic philosophy (reaching its zenith in the 1960s). This movement was directly influenced by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Even applied to current analytic philosophy, Stanley's statement is false. Consider what's going on at Pittsburgh these days. McDowell and Brandom explicitly acknowledge debts to Wittgenstein (Brandom's program of formulating pragmatic metavocabularies depends on the "pragmatist," i.e., Wittgensteinian, insight that the meaning of a word is its use).

Forget Quine, McTaggart, and the Stoics, I'm talking about Wittgenstein's direct and explicit influence. That influence on the last century of analytic philosophy is obvious and undeniable.

I read your piece on Wieseltier, and I'm not convinced. I won't go into the thing about Sullivan. That seems to me a red herring. The point you make about W's ignorance of philosophy is not made. When Wieseltier says, "It is because suffering is so hospitable to illusion that philosophers have often made an ideal out of lucidity," it seems to me that he is right, and your point about his disinterest, in Oxford, about logic and the logical analysis of language, sounds about right. I took several degrees in philosophy in the sixties and seventies, and logic and logical analysis of language was always at the centre of it. It wasn't a very good way to go, and later philosophy has moved in quite other directions, not because it's easy -- Berlin wasn't that easy -- but because it's more relevant to the human world, a world that Plato and Aristotle tried to discuss with some lucidity, as opposed to the illusion to which those who suffer (that's all of us) are so attracted. I think you miss the point, and your own understanding of philosoophy, and especially its recent history, is seriously wanting.

We're arguing about the relative weights of influences on analytic philosophy. The testimony of philosophers is obviously relevant data, and the claim that the influence of PI is limited in no way implies that there are no exceptions --- even important exceptions --- and so citing (again and again and again) the exceptions doesn't undermine the claim.

To generalize: It is true that an appeal to authority doesn't suffice to establish the truth of a proposition under consideration. It is also true that the testimony of authorities frequently establishes warrant to believe propositions. For example, if a well-regarded physicist reported a finding to you, you would be warranted in believing his report. (And more strongly, I argue, something would have gone wrong if you didn't believe his report.) Okay. Is it even conceivable that anyone would make the Stanley assertion with respect to Kripke? Frege? Almost certainly not.  

Various people have mentioned the people in analytic philosophy who are clearly and obviously influenced by Wittgenstein. First, there are obviously Wittgensteineans; people who think Wittgenstein in PI was substantially correct, and are devoted to explaining his project. In the United States, prominent examples are James Conant and Cora Diamond; in Britain, there is Peter Hacker. Those figures are prominent exponents of Wittgenstein's thought. Obviously, Wittgenstein scholars and exponents of Wittgenstein's thought are influenced by Wittgenstein. Equally obviously, Kripke scholars and scholars of Kripke's thought (such as Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon) are influenced by Kripke's thought. Indeed, for any philosopher x, scholars and proponents of x are influenced by x's thought. But I thought the issue was whether all of analytic philosophy is simply ruminations on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and whether this feature of analytic philosophy was responsible for the putative dryness of the discipline, not whether there are scholars and proponents of Wittgenstein's thought. I didn't as much intend to disparage the study of Wittgenstein's thought as I did to reinforce Daniel's comments that 'core' areas of analytic philosophy are not that much affected by Wittgenstein.

First, the figures that I have just mentioned (e.g. Conant, Diamond, and Hacker) are not exactly people that are exemplars of analytic philosophy. If anything, they are people who seek to bridge the analytic-continental divide (Conant writes on continental figures as much as he does analytic figures). Secondly, figures such as Brandom and McDowell, who have clearly been influenced by Wittgenstein, have also clearly been just as influenced by Kant and Hegel. Third, it can't very well be that Wittgenstein is the major influence on analytic philosophy when there are a tremendous number of topics currently discussed in analytic philosophy that really haven't been affected at all by Wittgenstein's thought. In my field, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein just isn't that relevant for most debates. One exception is the use theory of meaning, where Wittgenstein remains a significant influence. But in the conferences I go to, everyone just assumes that the use theory of meaning is false (whether rightly or wrongly). Similarly, programs like ordinary language philosophy, which were developed by people who were affected by Wittgenstein, are certainly not at the center of things anymore. I'm an active researcher in the philosophy of language, and I have never met a proponent of ordinary language philosopher. Finally, metaphysics, which is certainly one of the most active areas of contemporary analytic philosophy, is totally unaffected by Wittgenstein. So sure, Wittgenstein has had a substantial effect on analytic philosophy. It's clear some people have been affected by his work. But I think it's fair to say that on current debates he has figured less prominently than metaphysicians such as David Lewis or Saul Kripke, not to mention Frege and Russell. Certainly, one can have a top department in analytic philosophy where almost no one has been affected by his work. Indeed, my department is one such.

Jason Stanley writes, "But I think it's fair to say that on current debates he has figured less prominently than metaphysicians such as David Lewis or Saul Kripke, not to mention Frege and Russell."

I don't diasagree with this. I've been making two points: (1) Wittgenstein's influence on the last century of analytic philosophy is "second to none": two major movements in analytic philosophy -- logical positivism, and "ordinary language" philosophy -- are direct offshoots of Wittgenstein's thought; and (2) the current influence of Wittgensteinian ideas is not confined to debates about rule-following. There are prominent philosophers (Putnum, McDowell, Brandom) in current analytic philosophy who are not primarily interested in commenting on Wittgenstein but nonetheless rely (in some instances, heavily) on Wittgensteinian ideas. I take it you wouldn't disagree with either point.

I also do not deny that the vast majority of current philosophy of language either rejects or ignores Wittgensteinian ideas. Personally, I think this is a failing of current philosophy of language, but that's a different discussion.

N. N., I don't see why you're resisting this point (haven't we been over this before?). Surely you agree that Stanley-type philosophy is the norm in analytic philosophy these days (so, yes, current philosophy of language), Chicago being the only clear exception – Pitt has only a few dissenters, albeit large-named ones, and Harvard seems to be returning meekly to the fold. And you must also agree that such philosophy bears to Wittgenstein only the same distant relation that (say) Elliot Carter's music bears to that of Bach. Isn't it on characteristically Wittgensteinian grounds that you want to object to it?

That's why Daniel is right to bring up the question of "degrees of separation" (an interesting question in any case). It seems to me that, given its substance, the Wittgensteinian "influence" on that sort of thing is too diffuse to make a big deal about. Wittgenstein was influential, and is now much less so. You and I regret this and Daniel and Professor Stanley do not. But you surely agree that it is the case.

Remember the reason this all came up: Anonymous 4/24/08 1:09 AM's claim that

English and American philosophy departments by that time had given-up the task of "real philosophy" (i.e. studying the fundamental metaphysical, ontological, and epistomological problems, the great question of Man and Being, that have perplexed mankind for millennia) in favor of wallowing in the language games of analytical philosophy, largely under the baleful influence of Wittgenstein's claim that there are no genuine philosophical "problems", only "puzzles" to be solve by mathematical and linguisitc analysis. It was not "real philosophy" that Wieseltier fled, but the replacement of "real philosophy" by arid Wittgensteinian language games.

Note that this sub-Rortyan caricature is to apply to "analytical philosophy" as a whole. So if you're a typical "current" analytic philosopher, defending Wittgenstein from vague charges of philosophical nihilism will seem less to the point – especially since they themselves have been known to make such charges – than saying, truly, that metaphysics and epistemology are very much on the minds of contemporary analytic philosophers, and that Wittgenstein is not (but see also Daniel's #3). This makes arguing over his #4-7 beside the point (given the truth of #8).

Of course it helps that I have no interest in Leon Wieseltier's competence in philosophy or lack of same. But neither do you.

P.S. Upon refreshing, I see that Professor Stanley agrees with me. About this.

Oops, should have refreshed again.  Damn, N. N., you're quick.

Dave,

We are in (rare) agreement. I was objecting to what I (rightly, it seems to me) saw as the claim that Wittgenstein isn't and never has been particularly influential or relevant in analytic philosophy. There is no doubt that his influence has waned, but it has not been reduced to a footnote of Kripke's discussion of rule-following.

Since I have spent enought time on this when I should have been working (I blame you), I'll let that be my final word.

Let me add just one more thought.

My intention was never to disparage Wittgenstein in any way, and I hope noone has read me as arguing that Wittgenstein was a bad philosopher. Nor was my intention to argue that W. "isn't and never has been particularly...relevant in analytic philosophy." I am hardly a Wittgenstein expert, and so suspend judgment on this question, but I would not at all be shocked to find that Wittgenstein is extremely relevant. In earlier comments, in fact, I argued precisely for the point that a variety of past philosophers who are currently out of favor had insights that the contemporary scene would do well to acknowledge. I'm particularly sanguine about the prospects of rehabilitating Carnap --- but that doesn't mean Carnap, who influenced a very large number of important philosophers, including Quine (directly), is the dominant influence in analytic philosophy.

Again, I was responding to the claim that Leon Wieseltier was right to dismiss the study of logic and the logical analysis of language out of hand because they are nothing but the "baleful" products of Wittgenstein's aridity. And the point was that a claim like that clearly bespeaks an ignorance of the history of the tradition, since it attributes to Wittgenstein the introduction of elements to analytic philosophy that he did not introduce (and incorrectly labels them "Wittgensteinian language games"), and a degree of influence that he never attained (i.e., however influential you argue Wittgenstein was on the tradition, his influence was (pretty clearly) less than, say, Frege's).

One last thing. Not to give away too much personal detail, but at the program I'm starting in the fall, I'll be required to take at least one historical option, and since I'm not going to take more than one, and given my interests, the choice is between Wittgenstein and the rise of modern logic up to early Wittgenstein. I am not anti-Wittgenstein.

Daniel, I am not interested in defending Wieseltier (whom I've never heard of), and certainly not the conservatives lurking here. But a few comments on your view of philosophy seem called for.

You wrote: "One of the typical first steps to doing any analytic philosophy is
tracing the dialectical history of your subject --- in a large enough
space (say, a book), back to the Greeks, and in extensive detail." Is this really as typical as you say? Is there really all that much extensive detail in these attempts? Can you name more than a handful of examples, particularly among more or less mainstream figures? On top of that, you've just mentioned that you are going to a program that only requires one historical course (and the conception of history includes the 20th century). Given that taking only one historical course is clearly insufficient to get you a detailed dialectical history of pretty much any subject of interest (and someone who has had only one historical course in graduate school may not be especially likely to do good exegetical work on the history of philosophy, of the kind needed for a detailed dialectical history), does that mean that you are attending, by your own lights, a bad program?

This isn't meant as an underhanded insult. It just seems like you cannot have it both ways. You cannot at the same time claim that analytic philosophy takes the history of philosophy very seriously--more seriously, as you suggest, than continental philosophy--and at the same time freely recognize that typical analytic programs, ones that are considered quite good, are not especially concerned to ensure that their students are familiar with the history of philosophy. (Incidentally, that graduates of leading continental programs are generally much more knowledgeable about the history of philosophy than grads of leading analytic programs strikes me as widely acknowledged. The standard response to this, though, is usually to say that detailed study of the history of philosophy isn't that important after all; this may be the first time I've seen someone insist that analytic philosophy is actually better on the history!) And this, from what I can tell, seems to be your point: "But analytic philosophy, contrary to the reputation it
acquired among people who have strong, uninformed opinions about it,
incorporates the whole history of philosophy except the post-split Continental
tradition. Continental philosophy, by contrast, has an enormous historical
blindspot, namely most philosophy written in English since vernacular languages
replaced Latin in scholarly work."

Let me just point out that this last claim is patently false. Whatever uninformed opinions you may have about continental philosophy, it is just not true that engagement with Anglophone philosophy is absent from it. Husserl and Deleuze were quite fond of Hume; Mill's account of the "moral sciences" played a role in developing the German conception of the Geisteswissenschaften; Ricoeur has written on Strawson and Davidson, among others; Derrida has a well-known exchange with Searle on Austin's work. You may not know this work; and if you do, you may not think much of it. But thankfully your views on what is and what is not philosophically valuable are not the word of universal truth.

I don't have a problem with much of what you say; on the other hand, it seems to me that if you are going to trash someone for ignorance of philosophy, you should make an effort to yourself not display ignorance. One way to do this: don't assume that prejudices you picked up from your teachers are necessarily right, and don't state things you've vaguely heard as if they were fact. Examples:

"For example, Heidegger's corpus is rife with a priori
errors, errors he might have avoided if he knew any logic or math."

"More embarrassing still were the outright logical
trainwrecks, like what Carnap demonstrated when he painstakingly went through a
paper of Heidegger's and showed that it was strictly and literally meaningless."

Heidegger certainly knew quite a bit of logic and math, though he did not consider these to be the bedrock of philosophical reflection. Carnap did not painstakingly go through a Heidegger paper; he attacked Heidegger's use of a particular phrase ("das Nichts nichtet"). And as much as this phrase looks nonsensical taken out of context, it isn't like Heidegger didn't have arguments for speaking in this way. And, in any case, whatever problems one might have with this locution, the difficulty is certainly not just a logical one. Furthermore, that Carnap showed a certain locution, out of context, to be meaningless does not actually demonstrate that it is meaningless. Nor were Heidegger and Carnap that far removed--you might want to read Michael Freidman's A Parting of Ways on this topic.

If you want to criticize Wieseltier by insisting, among other things, that he knows nothing about analytic philosophy, perhaps the best way to do this is not to simply become a mirror image of him, making equally stupid claims based on your ignorance of continental philosophy.

I'd just like to say that I stand by N.N.'s claim that most of the things in Daniel’s list of "false claims" are themselves false or misleading. (And I have to assume from the character of the remarks that they are from the very same N.N. that runs that other blog.)

Unfortunately, I also have to agree with Dave M that "Stanley-type philosophy is the norm in analytic philosophy these days" (in America at the moment). To think that Stanley's claims about the absence of Wittgensteinian influence hold in the UK is to imagine that a man named Michael Dummett never existed to influence generations of philosophers there.

So, basically, what I'm saying is that both Daniel and Stanley correctly assert the state of contemporary analytic philosophy (here now), but N.N. asserts what is correct about contemporary analytic philosophy (in other words, what is worth preserving).

If one must do Stanley-type philosophy to do analytic philosophy, I don't want to be an analytic philosopher.

Roman, Timothy Williamson's Vagueness, in addition to being an argument for epistemicism is a history of the study of vagueness from the pre-Socratics to the present. Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne's introduction in Conceivability and Possibility sketches philosophers' views on conceivability and possibility from Descartes and Hume on. Ted Sider's introduction and early chapters in Four-Dimensionalism discuss the history of the metaphysics of time beginning with McTaggart. The first chapter of Jaegwon Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough gives a pretty detailed history of the debate over dualism and materialism. Just about every essay in Alvin Plantinga's Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality begins with a history of some philosophical view or views. (And maybe Plantinga's atypical, but he's nothing if not an analytic metaphysician.) I could go on; these are just some books on or near my desk. IIRC, Naming and Necessity begins with a history of views about proper names from Mill on. My college advisor, a hardcore analytic metaphysician, is working on a project that involves an extensively detailed history of some philosophical problems (can't give away more than that.) My own thesis included a long taxonomy of the possible positions in the debate between endurantism and perdurantism.

None of this should be surprising. No matter how original or fruitful a philosopher you might be, it's exceedingly unlikely that what you're working on is a philosophical question that's unrelated to any that's been explored before; so sketching out a history of the debate and where it stands makes pretty good methodological sense before laying out your own views. Hence it's very common in analytic philosophy. What you won't see much of is any social or cultural history of the circumstances in which certain views developed, and as I understand it, a lot of people doing continental philosophy (and many non-philosophers) think that's a blind-spot. I think it's a feature rather than a bug.

Re: my program. It's not in the US, it's based on 'options' rather than courses, of which you have to choose three total, at least one historical and one contemporary. That might give it away. Until all the paperwork on my scholarship's done, I'm going to cling to superstition like Pennsylvanians cling to guns and not say more.

Can't we all just agree that Leon Wieseltier is annoying?

Kevin,

I don't think anyone maintains that everyone should be interested in philosophy. I'm not that interested in (say) molecular biology; it just doesn't grab me. But I wouldn't conclude for that that molecular biology is not worth doing. I suggest that you take a similar attitude towards your lack of interest in philosophy.

But one thing that is misleading in your post is your suggestion that analytic philosophy is mainly an American thing, and elsewhere metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language is not done the way it is done here. For example, you cite the UK as an example. You write:

"To think that Stanley's claims about the absence of Wittgensteinian influence hold in the UK is to imagine that a man named Michael Dummett never existed to influence generations of philosophers there."

Timothy Williamson is the Wykham chair at Oxford; John Hawthorne is the Wynflete chair. Hawthorne and Williamson are each two of the major metaphysicians and epistemologists working today. Neither has been particularly influenced by Wittgenstein, and both work on philosophy that is just like the stuff I do (in fact, I've co-authored with both of them). Similarly, Herman Cappelen and Jessica Brown are the Arche research chairs at St. Andrews, another very prominent UK department. Neither is particularly influenced by Wittgenstein. I could go on with the exercise indefinitely with different universities in the UK. Sure, Peter Hacker is one of the eighty college fellows at Oxford, and there are scattered Wittgensteineans around (and of course Crispin Wright is moving to NYU, and is a prominent Wittgenstein scholar). But we also have pockets of Wittgenstein people in the states. The idea that the way we do analytic philosophy in the USA is somehow local to here is totally absurd, and reveals immense ignorance about the state of current world community. Look at the CVs of any well-known analytic philosopher and see where they give talks.  

As Daniel has been emphasizing, analytic philosophy is simply philosophy. There is no distinctive subject, 'analytic philosophy'. Many people who don't like analytic philosophy don't like analytic philosophy because they don't like philosophy. They also aren't going to be particularly attracted to reading Descartes, Hume, or Kant.