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Don't Just Do Something - Stand There: Why America Should Adopt a Strategy of Strategic Restraint |
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by Christopher Fettweis, September 23, 2008 |
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On Friday night, our two candidates will hold a debate on foreign policy. Most of the questions are fairly predictable; the responses, even more so. And one other thing is certain: If our founding fathers were in the audience, they would be uniformly horrified at what they heard. Both candidates will likely map out grand strategic visions that are radically different from that which served the nation quite well over its first 150 years.
A moment's consideration of their views might be in order as the next administration considers how best to move the country forward out of the morass of Iraq.
Not what Washington had in mind: Presidential candidate Barack Obama meets with Gordon Brown, prime minister of former colonizer Great BritainOn most matters, the United States worships Washington,
Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams and their compatriots as passionately as the
Romans did Romulus and Remus, and it still seeks their wisdom on a wide
variety of subjects, from constitutional questions to political theory
to religion. The hagiography, however, stops at the water's edge. The
founding fathers had quite clear views about grand strategy, but for
some reason their thoughts seem to be all but disregarded by most
modern strategists. When it comes to domestic policy, the word of the founders is gospel; in foreign policy, it is quaint.
In fact, grand strategy was one of the very few issues on which the founding fathers spoke with virtually one voice. With varying degrees of enthusiasm (and for different reasons), these men felt that the United States ought not squander the blessings of geography. They consistently and forcefully counseled their new nation to restrain itself. Washington was the most prominent advocate, arguing in his Farewell Address that "nothing is more essential" for the new nation "than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded." His "great rule" of strategy was that the United States ought to extend its commercial relations with foreign nations, but have with them "as little political connection as possible."
All of his colleagues, even those who were longstanding rivals on almost everything else, basically agreed with this sentiment. Alexander Hamilton advised Washington that "America's predisposition against involvement in Old World affairs" ought to be a "general principle of policy;" Thomas Jefferson was "for free commerce with all nations, political connection with none, and little or no diplomatic establishment." In his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine wrote that although "Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connection with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions." John Adams argued that "we should separate ourselves, as far as possible and for as long as possible, from all European politics and wars." This recommendation was heeded by his son, President John Quincy Adams, who in 1821 issued his famous and eloquent warning against going abroad in search of monsters to destroy.
Today's neoconservatives tell us that the founders didn't really mean what they said, and that these men were actually pragmatists who did not counsel a course separate from the rest of the world. Robert Kagan in particular, who is one of McCain's major foreign policy advisors, does an admirable job of constructing and then knocking down the straw man of an isolationist United States. It is however no great insight to argue that the United States always had a foreign policy, which is essentially what he does. Policymakers have always carried out robust debates over the proper course of action, and intervened in the affairs of other countries whenever it seemed wise to do so. The United States was never isolationist, and virtually no strategist today thinks it ought to be.
These modern re-interpretations of the history of U.S. foreign policy cannot wash away the obvious fact that for most of its existence, the United States defined threats, interests and opportunities quite narrowly, and maintained appropriately small militaries with which to address them. The affairs of the Old World in particular held little more than a passing interest to U.S. strategists, who felt that the oceans provided adequate buffer for most of the ills of the world. It was restraint, not isolationism, that dominated the grand strategy of this country for its first hundred and fifty years. During that time, the nation experienced steady economic growth and was unmolested by outside forces, eventually rising to become the strongest of the world's great powers. Strategic restraint seemed to serve the young nation quite well. It would likely do so again.
After the Second World War, a series of decisions were made to alter the traditional strategic approach, and the United States has followed an activist, internationalist path since. Each post-war administration eschewed the advice of the founders, and by the beginning of the twenty-first century internationalism had become imbedded in the national strategic conventional wisdom. The need for such activism is rarely even examined, much less seriously challenged.
The wisest grand strategy spends the least in order to gain the most; it minimizes costs and maximizes benefits. Activism is justified therefore only when there is clear necessity. America ought not be heavily involved abroad merely because it can, but only when it must (or, to the idealist, when it should). The default option for our leaders ought to be to not intervene in the affairs of others, and to lead by example, not by imposition.
We would all be better off if the winner in November followed a strategy of strategic restraint.
One can hope that generalized discontent with the strategy of the current administration will lead to a re-examination of the proper role of the United States in the world. The public may indeed be a bit more open to restraint, now that they have seen the consequences of its opposite. Like an alcoholic, sometimes a nation must hit rock bottom before it sees the need to make drastic changes. To the vast majority of the American people, Iraq looks like rock bottom.
One can hope the debate would start such a conversation.
One can hope for a lot of things, I suppose.
Christopher Fettweis, author of Losing Hurts Twice As Bad, is guest blogging on Jewcy, and he'll be here all week. Stay tuned.
JimN
Hey Chris. Good article or blog or whatever. Does our involvement in NATO make it more difficult to stay out of some conflicts? Under article 5 of the charter, an attack on one member will be regarded as an attack on all. I know this has come up more with Georgia looking to join NATO. I read that NATO dissuaded Romania and Bulgaria from beefing up their defenses. Doesn't this put more pressure on the US to do more since we have the biggest military?
-Smilin' Jim
Rob
The fact that President Thomas Jefferson fought the first war this nation had against an Islamic enemy during he Barbary Wars off the coast of North Africa in 1801 puts a slight wrinkle in your sophist and ham-fisted argument. I guess Jefferson was the first neo-con.
As for the 20th Century, American restraint in 1939 helped in part to get the Holocaust underway. The American restraint that you call for again when it comes to nations like Iran may very well produce the second one.
Please educate yourself. There is no excuse for ignorance in this day and age.
AnonymousObama Shitzker
I totally second Mr Fettwies's sentiments. Israel is a shitty littlecountry that just irritates the Islamic world against the west. Let Iran nuke it. The only downside to this action is that it may cause a massive carbon footprint, which might be blamed on our Jewish community. However, one must be prepared to take risks for peace
Anonymous
isolationism does not equal restraint. Even proponents of strategic restraint would have gotten involved in WWII because it was in the national interest of our country. Rob seems to like straw men, much like all other neo-cons. Fettweis isn't saying we should stay out of all conflicts with other nations - merely that we should stay out of stupid ones that have nothing to do with out national interest.
Rob
How was war against Germany in Europe more an national interest to our country on December 8 instead of December 6, 1941? Especially since it included fighting a two front war not only against Japan but also against Germany; a nation that never attacked us.
A war against a nation that never attacked us? Gee, I think I heard the argument somewhere before.
Fettweis
Rob
Uh, Iraq was firing on US and UK aircraft as they carried out a UN mandate and was already in a state of war with the United States by March, 2003. Hussein was much more hostile to the United States in 2003 than Hitler was in 1941. Pesky little facts indeed. Do you plan to start making apologies and excuses for your book now or in 20 years?
Anonymous
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Fettweis
Number of Americans killed by Saddam Hussein (or people supported by Saddam Hussein), 1992-March 2003: 0.
Yes, I see your point, he was a major threat to US interests. Thank God for the war!
Rob
I would call you an idiot but critics on Amazon beat me to it and critics not yet born will take over after me. Consider a Hussein and his degenerate sons with sanctions gone and collecting billions in oil revenue now with a soon to be nuclear Iran next door and North Korea willing to sell a nuke off the shelf. Instead Hussein got justice and so did the Iraqi people who will have several elections under their belt by the time your book is out of print. In the words of Edward R. Morrow while reporting from Buchenwald in 1945, "If I have offened you by this rather mild account...I am not in the least bit sorry."
Zeevico
Question is, what do nukes actually give Hussein? Nothing. He can't use them. Hussein was a foolish man. His political views were informed by moronic conspiracy theories and he took senseless risks. But nuclear weapons (to quote) tend to concentrate the mind. That's the beauty of Mutually Assured Destruction.
Saddam's connections to Al Qaeda were known both prior to, and after the war to be tenuous and irrelevant. As a leader, he could not stomach loss of control over any of his resources. Handing nuclear weapons to Al Qaeda would be a handoff to an organisation that opposed him ideologically, would refuse to work under his command and would not do his bidding. In short, an impossibility for the total control freak that Saddam was.
Saddam supported many terrorist organisations. But this support was comparitively insignificant. Iraq was but one of many state sponsors of terror and among them was one of the poorest. Removing it from the scene would have had a trivial effect on these organisations, whose existence is predicated on the popular support they command--whether in Gaza and the West Bank, Lebanon, or elsewhere.
The invasion of Iraq was an immensely unpopular idea in the Middle East and the Muslim world generally. It generated a lot of antagonism towards the West and America especially. There is no doubt that it has served to radicalise the very people the West is trying to win over to its cause.
I will grant that there was likely very little opportunity to learn much about Iraq's social structure and sectarian rivalries prior to the invasion. In a totalitarian regime like Saddam's, you could only learn about the greatness of the Ba'ath--not about the Iraqi people.
The entire affair has been a failure. What America should do now--I do not know. I have not kept up to date with Iraqi politics, except for the scant information published in newspapers nowadays.