| Hitchens v. D'Souza, and Thoughts on the New Atheism Debate | |
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by Josh Strawn, October 23, 2007
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In the climate of our postmodern culture, few things are less "post" than defending science and rationality against superstition and wooly thinking. With most engaged in the hysterical bid to adopt the correctly "nuanced perspective" and a "wide reaching respect for difference" combined with an "open mind" that is "resistant to totalizing," it seems as if today one needn't look far to find the next public conversation where cognitive dissonance is celebrated and clear thinking is dismissed as "arrogance." Last night's King's College-sponsored debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza at the Center For Ethical Culture was only another such event.
Debate roundups for these scenarios can be every bit as useless as the book reviews of Hitchens and D'Souza's respective diatribes against and in favor of religion. Both debaters make their cases about as well as they can be made. Whether you prefer the acerbic anti-theistic style of one or the pulpit punditry of the other is a matter of taste. Whether you think one was more right than another, however, depends on your basic understanding of rational argumentation and the scientific method as well as the limitations of both.
What's most interesting in this regard is not D'Souza, who essentially regurgitates theistic errors and rhetorical sidesteps, but those in the audience who applauded his points. But this isn't to say they were all idiots. D'Souza himself is a well-spoken fellow, with a decent enough command of the history of science and the ins-and-outs of certain philosophical problems. It is precisely what he upheld in spite of intelligence and knowledge that becomes the most intriguing/disturbing. D'Souza knew the speed of light off the top of his head (easy enough, but still uncommon), he knew the legacy of seminal geneticists, and a few basics about Einstein (even if he tried underhandedly to pass him off as a theist). The majority of the great scientific minds throughout history, he said, were religious, therefore science is proof of religion's truth. He had the auditorium's Christians alight with the notion that their camp had been responsible for the majority of scientific accomplishment throughout history. But for the things he did know, did he not know that the majority of minds throughout history have been religious due in no small part to the threat of death for proclaiming any other worldview--a threat that has been with most humans for most of their years on this planet?
D'Souza's compartmentalized his thinking and is thus so unaware of what it feels like to stand on solid argumentative ground, he couldn't possibly be aware how much he's leap-frogging. What do I mean by leap-frogging? One example: in his opening statements, he proposed to prove the value of religion on the basis of evidence with no recourse to superstition. For the remainder of the discussion, he proceeded to remind everyone that certainty was problematic, thus negating the atheist's adherence to evidential argument. Furthermore, he consistently reproached Hitchens for not presenting evidence, meanwhile failing to live up to his initial promise. Instead, he reiterated the impossibility of evidence-based certainty. Whatever lily-pad will keep you from sinking, I guess...
But Hitchens could have done more to educate the folks who were getting off on his opponent's bullshit (and I mean that in the most Harry G. Frankfurt sense of the word). Not once did he remind Dinesh that atheism is not a firm belief but rather a stance with regard to knowledge. In fact, D'Souza actually made this point himself accidentally when he reminded us that in absence of evidence of unicorns he feels no need to speak out for their non-existence but simply lives as if there are none. I'd have like to have heard Hitchens remind him that a) the belief in absurdity is offensive on its own b) that if part of the unicorn myth involved the sanctioning of murder in the name of one's unicorn tribe, it would become necessary to fervently attack the belief in unicorns and that c) if Dinesh understands this principle with regard to unicorns, his willingness to suspend it for the Christian God proves his hypocritical selectivity and disqualifies him as one worth paying any attention to when he speaks about the universe and the human mind operating according to a rational set of laws.
But to Hitchens: why not school people in precisely how the human mind does work at this point in the argument? It certainly does obey laws--laws so material that the notions of subjectivity and consciousness on which the theist's argument rest get blown to smithereens. If a human subject with a "mind" who makes ethical decisions that transfer to his or her immortal soul suffers a brain injury impairing his or her interpretive systems, ability to read human emotions (key to the brain response we know as 'compassion') then what's happened to the soul? If I can remove the part of a person's brain that enables ethical judgment, have I not surgically removed their moral soul? This connection between what the religious call the soul and what is known about material brain functionality severely undermines the theist's notion of the "I" that makes choices that bear on "my" eternal soul. If I'm a neuroscientist, I can plug your immortal soul into a machine and map it's electricity.
Descartes believed that somewhere in the brain there was a driver's seat for the soul--the site where "you" make the decision to act, whether morally or immorally. But the "I" that so many take for granted is known to be nothing more than the brain's interpretation of its own complex functioning. Multiple things occur in the brain that the "I" isn't aware of and couldn't control no matter how hard it tried. The notion of heaven, this place where all the "I"s will someday go because of things they did or didn't do, is not commensurate with what is known about the brain. The human "I" in other words is little more than the transcendentalizing of an evolved brain phenomenon. If one accepts evolution, as D'Souza does, then one must also accept that these brains once had no ability to conceive of themselves in this way, much less to glorify it so. And so grows a new problem for the theist--not the atheist--to explain, one that isn't unlike the ensoulment debate regarding abortion. Whence did the soul of the "I" come into being in terms of human evolution? And how can something be transcendent if it can be surgically removed?
Many have charged the new atheists of wearing out an old argument and passing off as if its new. But these questions are completely current. Francis Crick proclaimed the brain to be the great frontier of the 21st century and it has only been with the advent of computers in the last 20-30 years that the intensive acceleration in learning has taken place. Hitchens, Dennett, Harris, and Dawkins are not beating dead horses by the name of Russell or Nietzsche. They are pushing back the post-everything world's increasing tendency to accept bullshit. And their rebuttals to this trend stand on foundations that aren't hundreds or thousands but mere tens of years old. Hitchens could have been a bit more forward with some of this information. D'Souza could stand to be a bit more aware of it. But hey, the best bullshitters are the ones who believe their own bullshit.
People can throw around things like "nuance," "respect for difference," "open mindedness," and "resistance to totalizing schemes" all they like. To be sure, each quality is desirable. But what's undesirable is when these catchphrases are taken as gospel by smart people and turned into smokescreens for scientific illiteracy. This is precisely where the collusion of the faithful and the post-modernists takes place--it's an alliance soldered together by these kinds of platitudes that make an enemy out of evidence, should evidence possibly create some friction. It would even appear to arise from a need, common to both the post-modernists and the faithful, to be just a little more clever than science. A little more current. A little more du jour. The Christians want to be so far ahead of their time they're always extending the timelines. Death? Nah, they're ahead of the game. End of Earth? Ahead. End of the universe? So five minutes ago. They're livin' forever.
But really, the most difficult thing to swallow is these are mostly smart people. To quote Frankfurt, this is the essence of bullshit--the bullshitter "does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. He pays no attention to it at all. By virtue of this, bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are." Plenty of that going around courtesy of King's College last night in New York City.
[Watch the Hitchens/D'Souza debate here.]
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Josh Strawn is the lead singer of Blacklist as well as a signatory and vocal advocate of the Euston Manifesto. More... |
jaywilton
Hitchens Sucks and....
Sheeit;I missed it.But I've heard Hitchens elsewhere b-sing about his book and I hope D'Souza kicked his ass.
Anonymous
Dinesh D'Silly
After D’Sousza’s recent attempt to forge a Christianist/Islamist alliance for theocratic morality it is hard to take him seriously about anything. Even when he agrees with me I can’t help but wishing he was on the other side. At least he is being entirely silly and his foolishness makes the theists look bad.
Certainly one can live ignoring people who believe in unicorns -- Christians are not so easy to ignore. They unicornist doesn’t come knocking on my door trying to convert me. They don’t run TV networks preaching incredible nonsense. They don’t lobby to have a unique unicornist morality imposed on others at the point of a gun. They aren’t trying to pass laws to teach unicorn theory in biology classes. He seems to neglect the obvious fact that nuts who believe in unicorns leave other people alone while he and his friends on the religious right never stop interfering with others and actually feel morally compelled to interfere as often as possible.
Anonymous
That was a fantastic essay
Thanks, Mr. Strawn. That was beautifully written.
FGFM
Trying to say something, Decent?
that if part of the unicorn myth involved the sanctioning of murder in the name of one's unicorn tribe, it would become necessary to fervently attack the belief in unicorns
Marple
The mind
And how can something be transcendent if it can be surgically removed?
It cannot, but christians believe what is transcendent is spiritual. If you smash your computor and it no longer works for you or works poorly, you walk away.If it's the only means you have at communicating to the outside world via the innernet your communication will be effected according to the damage done but you are not damaged, just your connection to the world of the innernet.
If I can remove the part of a person's brain that enables ethical judgment, have I not surgically removed their moral soul?
No you have not, just the souls connection to the world
Josh Strawn
In other words...
..the "soul" still sits round in it's little Cartesian theater, its only forced to twiddle its thumbs for a while, waiting for the body's end to release it to its restored maximum potential. I understand what Christians think and it is mistaken; it is based on what was once an intuitive understanding of the self and the mind that's now obsolete. There is basically zero debate about this among serious neuroscientists.
Gregory C.
Right Josh, there really is
Right Josh, there really is no debate. And the Christian,neo-medieval, post-Cartesian claim that the "will" or the decision-making faculty is somehow removed from the brain seems remarkably silly in light of recent research on intentionality. Strong evidence shows that the "decision" for action, the moment one "wills" to do something, actually follows the neural signaling for that action to be done. So the whole notion of volition, of a soul that can be held separately responsible by God for "leading" the body around, is utterly facile. I wish more people debating these subjects would focus on the neuroscience, since here there is so little room for equivocation.
Bryan
scoping out Strawn's presuppositions
Mr. Strawn appears to think that Hitchens would be better off pointing to the scientific understanding of the mind. This approach, in my opinion, would expose Hitchens to a withering critique of his moral outrage following the lines of C. S. Lewis' argument in "The Abolition of Man." Hitchens, in the end, could be made guilty of the fallacy of the stolen premise.
Now, from what I have seen of Hitchens I'm not at all certain that he has any conception of the difficulties he might have in attempting a coherent metaphysical justification for morality--certainly the Hitchens' Challenge that he repeats in debate hints at a rudimentary understanding of the trouble non-theistic worldviews encounter in attempting to explain morality coherently.
Strawn's proposed debate strategy prompts me to wonder whether Strawn knows what he'd be getting Hitchens into.
gogityershinebox
Neuroscience of the Mind
I think people are scared to look at how our brain works. On the very basic level, which I am acquainted, it seems as if we really don't have freewill. We just make decisions based on chemical reactions.
That's a scary thing, because it opens up the deepest of questions about the meaning of our own lives. I mean, freewill sounds much better and hopeful, than being a collection of chemical reactions that rule our actions. Even the resistance of an urge is based on a chemical action.
Bryan
reply to gogityershinebox
It's simpler than that, GGYSB.
If we don't have free will it doesn't really matter whether or not we're scared to think about the meaning of our lives. We'll think about what we'll think about based on preceding states of matter regardless of the emotion of fear.
The lack of free will takes takes away the sense of blaming somebody for having wrong beliefs--other than the fact that you were compelled by preceding states of matter to to assert the blame in the first place.
One apparent fact (at least one, I should say) should give determinists pause, however. If all of our actions are determined by preceding states of matter, then why should we be conscious of our actions? What's the point? We should be able to do everything just the same minus consciousness, like robots or NPC characters in a video game. And it would be simpler. What evolutionary advantage pertains to self-awareness if self-awareness results in no changes to otherwise predetermined behaviors?
Josh Strawn
Lewis?
These quandaries have been addressed, even if they have not been resolved (as if they ever were prior to discoveries in neuroscience). In fact, Hitchens' allies, Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris all comprise different portions of the answer to how morality and responsibility exist in a materialist framework. Lewis nor Dostoyevsky has a trump card just because brains are matter and the body isn't acted upon by a ghostly entity. Read Dawkins on altruism, Dennett on free will as evolving phenomenon, Harris on the importance of beliefs (which are neurophysiological facts of the brain) corresponding as correctly as possible with the outside world. Hitchens' great gifts to this debate in my view are eloquence, charisma and sharp, clear-spoken synthesis of the arguments. I only hope his diatribes soon incorporate some of his contemporaries more so than they currently do. And I keep harping on this but 'Metaphysics' was a name given by its editors to the book after Aristotle's 'Physics.' It means 'after physics.' As in the book that comes after the book 'Physics.' Nowhere did Aristotle claim that he believed in a realm beyond the reach of scientific explanation or understanding. What is thought of as 'metaphysical' is generally better thought of as a temporary explanation or way of understanding. Either that or a psychic tool used by the organism to organize thoughts and reality to the end of survival/fitness/pleasure, etc.
Bryan
Dawkins?
Hitchens could use better allies.
Here's Dennett appealing, at least, to the possibility of a metaphysical basis for ethics (invoking it as "transcendental") from a physicalist/naturalist perspective--but note the absence of a epistemological strategy for apprehending it that couldn't just as well pass for "might makes right"? And what reason is there to literally expect that a transcendental basis for ethics does, in fact, exist? Is it not comparable to the god question in the first place?
http://meaningoflife.tv/video.php?speaker=dennett&topic=goodwogod
The same video finds Dennett settling on a compatibilist version of free will. If Dennett's view of freedom is legitimate then it seems so is the view of the hardest Calvinist. His is not an enviable position when it comes to justifying moral responsibility in the individual (you just can't get there plausibly without rejecting the neuroscience lauded above--though I'm open to seeing a surprisingly good attempt).
Dawkins has already done his part in poisoning Hitchens' arguments with his wholly ridiculous response to the anthropic principle.
I'm surprised that Harris warranted a mention. You can't mean Sam Harris, can you Mr. Strawn?
"Harris makes so many mistakes in this presentation that I simply cringe
in frustration just to hear him speak. It is the same when I hear
Richard Dawkins discuss morality ..." (review by a fellow atheist)
http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2007/04/sam-harris-morality-and-reli...
I fail to see how Dennett's view of free will and morality can make Hitchens' moral argument any easier. Perhaps you can offer the beginnings of an explanation?