So much of the political debate is focused on the binary assumption that the U.S. and allies must either stay the course in Iraq (with or without more troops) or disengage completely.  As has been pointed out ad nauseum, neither option is acceptable.  No increase in soldiers can stop determined guerillas and suicide bombers;  the Americans learned this, belatedly, in Vietnam (as far as guerillas were concerned, anyway).  Even reinstituting the draft, which the lame-duck Bush administration won't do, wouldn't help.  Conversely, disengagement would leave a weak Iraqi coalition government at the mercy of three warring factions plus Iran, with years of anarchy and ethno-religious massacres the likely result.

There is a third way which, although many others have suggested it, doesn't seem to be on the U.S. and Iraqi governments' table.  That option is to convene a conference of the U.S., the present Iraqi government, and the Shiite and Kurdish resistance leaders.  This conference must have one and only one purpose:  to divide the territory now called Iraq the way it should have been divided long ago,  into three states:  Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish.  As a necessary condition for receiving U.N. membership and international foreign aid, the three new states would have to sign a non-aggression pact, including but not limited to cessation of suicide bombings and other terrorist actions. This pact would be enforced with a combination of peacekeeping forces and a (much smaller!) number of U.S. and allied troops.  These forces, if properly trained and equipped, would not only prevent the new nations from imploding or invading each other, but also discourage Iran from taking control, whether directly or by proxy.